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ABSTRACT 
With Romania’s acceptance into NATO, the Republic of Moldova found itself at 
the frontier of the North-Atlantic Alliance. This thesis evaluates the impact of NATO and 
European Union enlargements on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict in the 
eastern part of the Republic of Moldova. Theoretically, recent changes in the geo-
political environment in Europe can bring a new impetus to the process of political 
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In the wake of these changes, Moldovan 
leadership is looking for new supporters to back Moldova in the stand-off against Russia 
on the Transnistrian issue. In this respect, NATO and the EU appear to be appropriate 
candidates. Either one of these two organizations, taken separately, possesses enough 
potential to create an asymmetry against Russia. Would these two institutions get more 
involved in the fate of this intra-state conflict? Possible courses of action of actors 
involved will be analyzed through the prisms of realism and liberal institutionalism 
theories of international relations. Rationale for further enlargement will be assessed 
against “soft power” resources, such as values, norms and knowledge, accumulated over 
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In March 1992, an armed conflict erupted between the central government of the 
Republic of Moldova and the breakaway Transnistrian region – a separatist entity in the 
Eastern part of Moldova.1 Over 300 people died in the violent clashes and more than 
1,000 were wounded. This thesis does not intend, however, to re-tell the controversial 
history of the two regions (Bessarabia2 and Transnistria) that culminated in a fratricidal 
civil war in early 1990s. This job has been beautifully done by Charles King, Nicolas 
Dima, and a number of other scholars.3 The focus of the thesis is on what happened after 
the conflict. 
While briefly assessing the post-conflict developments and performance of 
external mediators involved in the negotiations process, this thesis evaluates the impact 
of enlargements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union on 
the Transnistrian conflict resolution process. Recent changes in the geo-political 
environment on the European continent, theoretically, can bring a new impetus to the 
process of political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Would these two institutions 
get more involved in the fate of the intra-state conflict in the eastern part of the Republic 
of Moldova? Why would they?  
Since 1992, negotiations between the two conflicting parties were mediated by the 
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, Russia and the Ukraine. After 
                                                 
1 The region lies along the left bank of Nistru River (although in many sources the river appears under 
its Russian name Dniestr). From here comes the name of the region Trans-Nistria. 
2 More on modern history of Bessarabia can be found in Ştefan Ciobanu, Unirea Basarabiei: Studiu Si 
Documente Cu Privire La Mişcarea Naţională Din Basarabia În Anii 1917-1918 (Chişinau: Editura 
“Universitas,” 1993), Romanian. Another useful publication on the subject published by the “Universitas” 
Publishing House can be The Pact Molotov-Ribbentrop And Its Consequences for Bessarabia: Documents 
(Chişinau: Publishing House “Universitas,” 1991). 
3 For a detailed historical analysis of the region see Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, 
and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institutions Press, 2000) and Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia And 
Bukovina: Eastern Monographs (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1982). For a thorough analysis of 
causes of the Transnistrian conflict see Stuart J. Kaufman, Spiraling to Interethnic War: Elites, Masses and 
Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War, International Security, Vol. 21 No. 2 (Autumn, 1996). The chronology of 
events leading to the armed confrontation in the Transnistrian region is very well documented by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Paul Sullivan in Russian and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, 
And Analysis (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997). 
2 
thirteen years of negotiations, it has become obvious that the existing mechanisms and 
format, established in 1992 (and which played a role in freezing the “hot spot”), are 
exhausted, outdated and ineffective.4 Neither the OSCE nor the UN has proposed 
workable mechanisms and approaches. Moreover, existing decision-making mechanisms 
within these two organizations allowed Russia to veto any decision taken (or considered) 
on the Transnistrian issue that would have been against its interests. OSCE, as a 
consultative forum, does not have an enforcing mechanism to impose its decisions on the 
member-states. Thus, the organization’s “envoy” to the conflict, OSCE Mission to 
Moldova, looked from the very beginning like a “handicapped coach”: smart and 
knowledgeable, but physically unable to reach out and stop the wrongdoings. The cease-
fire agreement signed on 21 July 1992, provided the deployment of Russian 
peacekeeping forces in the Transnistrian region which, in fact, prolonged Russian 
military presence in the area.5 It is true that the ceasefire agreement has never been 
violated by either party since it was signed. However, what “Russian peacekeeping” did 
not provide (and actually did not intend to provide) were conditions for the political 
settlement of the conflict. Under Russian protection, Transnistria has consolidated as an 
authoritarian state over the years, and may now challenge Kosovo in the de facto degree 
of independence. 
From the outset of confrontation, Transnistrian leadership was trying to apply an 
ethnic aspect to the conflict and align Transnistria with other separatist regimes in the 
post-Soviet geopolitical space – Abkhazia, South Osetia, Nagorno-Karabakh. Throughout 
                                                 
4 A large number of publications by Moldovan and foreign analysts and political scientists have 
addressed the weaknesses of the OSCE as a security organization in Europe. For a detailed analysis see 
Robert Barry, The OSCE: A Forgotten Transatlantic Security Organization? (British American Security 
Information Council, Research Report 2002.3, July 2002); Vladimir Socor, “Apusul OSCE” (MoldovaAzi),  
Romanian. Last accessed in January 2006 at: http://politicom.moldova.org/comentarii/rom/315/. The article 
is also published in English under the title “Vienna Sunset” in The Wall Street Journal Europe 2-4 Sep 
2005. 
5 The controversy of this “peacekeeping operation” was discussed in a number of analyses on post 
Cold War peacekeeping. See William J. Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars 
of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). For a study on peacekeeping operation in the 
Transnistrian region of Moldova see Lynch, Dov. Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases 
of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000); Raymond C. 
Finch, III, MAJ, U.S. Army, “The Strange Case of Russian Peacekeeping Operations in the Near Abroad 
1992-1994” (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 1996). Last accessed January 
2006 at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rus-pko/rus-pko.htm, and John Mackinlay and Peter 
Cross, Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations 
University Press, 2003). 
3 
the 1990s, Western scholars of inter-ethnic conflicts studied all these conflicts 
extensively. Hence, the European public also became better informed on the issue of the 
Transnistrian conflict. An average database would take you to the official web page of 
the Transnistrian government, president, parliament, and so forth. Even the extensive 
Transnistrian propaganda over all these years could not obscure one distinct aspect of the 
Transnistrian conflict, one that comes from a different prospective. The inter-ethnic 
hatred failed to become the main drive of the conflict. Among the named conflicts, the 
real reason for the violence – the struggle for power and wealth – was never as obvious or 
apparent as it was in the case of Transnistria. The situation is fully under the control of 
Russia, which, theoretically, makes conflict resolution possible.  
As for today, some 700,000 citizens of the Republic of Moldova, living on the left 
bank of the Nistru River, are being held as political hostages by a criminal regime that 
does everything it wishes and is not subjected to any kind of external control from the 
international community. 
In this stalemate, the Moldovan leadership was looking for new supporters who 
possessed sufficient potential power – and could back Moldova in the stand-off against 
Russia on the Transnistrian issue. In this respect, NATO and the EU seemed to be 
appropriate candidates. Throughout the 1990s, however, both these institutions were 
undergoing transformation (NATO) and consolidation (EU) processes. To a large degree, 
that fact contributed to the ignorance of the Transnistrian problem for about a decade.  
In the meantime, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept “reaffirmed the risks and 
uncertainties facing the members and other states in the Euro-Atlantic region, such as 
ethnic conflict, the abuse of human rights, political instability, economic fragility and the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.”6 But more importantly, international terrorism 
was increasingly becoming the number one threat facing allies in the post–Cold War 
security environment. Needless to say, the September 11 attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York underlined the complexity and severity of the problem. The 
international community mobilized to support the United States in the declared War on 
Terror. The rogue regimes around the world were closely monitored by the international 
                                                 
6 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 45-46. 
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community. In this context, the Moldovan government presented more than enough 
evidence of links between the uncontrolled separatist regime in Transnistria and terrorist 
organizations. Huge ammunition and armaments stockpiles located in the Transnistrian 
region (as well as an arms-manufacturing industry) remain under the control of 
unaccountable Transnistrian leadership. “If Al Qaeda has not gone shopping there yet, it 
is only a matter of time.”7 
As a Washington Post editorial pointed out, “Military records show that at least 
thirty-eight Alazan8 warheads were modified [in Transnistria] to carry radioactive 
material, effectively creating the world’s first surface-to-surface dirty bomb.”9 An 
Associated Press (AP) correspondent also stressed that the “AP investigation involving 
interviews with a dozen officials and experts strengthened suspicions that Transnistria is 
a hotbed of unregulated weapons transactions” and a “repository of rocket-mounted ‘dirty 
bombs.’”10 Another set of illicit activities widely flourishing in the Transnistrian region – 
bringing enormous profits to its leaders – are human trafficking, drugs and arms 
smuggling. Daniel Twining, a director of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., 
identified Transnistria as “a leading exporter of kidnapped women to Europe, a lucrative 
transit territory for illicit drugs, and a key link in the arms-smuggling network that 
peddles the Soviet Union’s former military hardware on the international market.” 
Transnistria, as stated by Rudolf Perina, the former U.S. Ambassador to Moldova, 
became the biggest “black market” and “duty free zone” in Europe. Big profits clearly 
shape the interests of the local elite, who want to preserve the status quo for as long as 
possible. 
Considering all of these views, this thesis addresses the following questions:  
• Will Moldova benefit from NATO and/or EU enlargement in terms of the 
Transnistrian conflict settlement, or will it be left alone to deal with its 
internal problems?  
                                                 
7 Daniel Twining, “Beware Russia’s pocket empire,” Christian Science Monitor 1 Jul 2004. 
8 “Alazan” – The code name of Russian Multiple Launch Rocket System. 
9 Jobby Warrick, “Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear. Stocks of Soviet-Era Arms For Sale on Black 
Market,” The Washington Post 7 Dec 2003. 
10 George Jahn, “Hotbed of weapons deals,” The Washington Times 16 Jan 2004. 
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• Why and how can the European Union and NATO tolerate, for over a 
decade so far, illegal activities in the Transnistrian region of the Republic 
of Moldova?  
• Are the stakes involved – in the relations of both alliances with Russia – 
really so high that they could undermine the perils emanating from the 
uncontrolled authoritarian regime put in Transnistria? 
 
B. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis dedicates a separate chapter to each of the two potential players that 
could have become involved in the Transnistrian conflict-resolution process: The North-
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. However, before the reader 
becomes acquainted with the possibilities and limitations of both alliances, Chapter II 
provides the background on what other involved actors have done so far in respect to 
Transnistria. Interests, official statements, and the practical deeds of stakeholder-states in 
Transnistrian dispute – Russia, Ukraine, and Romania – are also briefly assessed. 
Romania, initially present at the negotiations over Transnistria, was eventually squeezed 
out. That fact did not seem to create a significant disturbance among the politicians in 
Bucharest. Moreover, the turn of events seemed to fit their plans even better. Now they 
could totally devote their resources and energy to negotiations – with Brussels and 
Washington – for their eventual adherence to NATO and the EU. The Ukraine, another 
guarantor-state, has officially adopted a very ambiguous position (although a pro-Russia 
and pro-Transnistria mood was predominant). The victory of pro-Western forces in the 
2004 presidential elections in the Ukraine raised hopes that the attitude of the Ukrainian 
political class towards the Transnistrian conflict would change.  
The second purpose of the chapter is to provide a comparative analysis of the 
potential of different agencies, institutions and states, before and after the NATO and EU 
enlargement. Possible courses of action for the actors involved are analyzed through the 
prisms of realism and liberal institutionalism theories of international relations. 
Policies and strategies of any alliance can not be assessed separately from the 
policies of key states – those that basically run the alliance. Thus, NATO policies should 
be considered in context with U.S. policies. In this respect, Chapter III discusses the 
intra-alliance developments during the post–Cold War era, determined to a large extent 
6 
by the visions of the American political establishment of Europe. A separate portion of 
the chapter assesses policies of the United States towards Eastern Europe at different 
points in time.  
Likewise, the European Union’s doctrines and strategies are evaluated in Chapter 
IV through the prism of Germany and France’s visions of the Union’s foreign policy.  
Chapter III and Chapter IV summarize the opinions vis-à-vis the expansion of both 
institutions (NATO and EU) to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Although skeptics 
were assessing the chances of Romania joining NATO as very low in the late 1990s (the 
country was viewed as likely to become the “frontline of a wider South-Eastern European 
region on the periphery of NATO,”11) Romania today is a member of the North-Atlantic 
Alliance. The same mood was (and still is) predominant in respect to the Romania’s 
acceptance into the European Union. Although the behavior pattern of the two alliances is 
different, and so are the factors that influence decisions, Romania’s chances to become a 
member of the EU have significantly increased with adherence to NATO.  
Russia is the third actor discussed in this thesis in connection to NATO and the EU 
enlargement to South-Eastern Europe, and a possible involvement in the resolution of the 
Transnistrian conflict. In this context, Chapter V evaluates the stakes involved in the triangle of 
players: NATO, EU and Russia. In spite of all skepticism, Russia is still a major player in world 
politics, especially in this particular region. Its interests in this region are well known, and far-
reaching strategic goals have been extensively described by political scientists. In the last few 
years, Russia was registering success in pursuing two out of three objectives ascribed to a state by 
neo-realist theory of international relations: “increasing its influence over the behavior of other 
states” and “exercising influence over the world economy.”12 Whatever amendments will be 
made in the existing format of negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict (excluding unwanted 
members, as happened with Romania, or inviting new members – USA and EU), Russia will 
always be present at the negotiations table. 
The Conclusion summarizes the pros and cons of NATO and the EU involvement in the 
fate of the Transnistrian conflict. Even if things evolve according to Moldova’s wishes and plans 
                                                 
11 Charles King, The European Question in Romania and Moldova, in Ambivalent Neighbors: The 
EU, NATO and the Price of Membership, ed. Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin (Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 258.  
12 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
24.   
7 
(which is very doubtful at the moment) the solution for the Transnistrian conflict would most 
likely be a compromise agreed upon by three actors: NATO (read USA), the EU and Russia. 
Compromise is not always the best solution; it excludes, by its nature, the clear victory of one 
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II. TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT: POST-CONFLICT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
 
All wars result from political decisions and express a political intent – 
whether or not the politics are realistic and may be regarded as desirable – 
does not mean that any particular war is necessarily appropriate for 
implementing the policy it serves. 
−Peter Paret13 
It was the spring of 1992 when armed conflict erupted, lasted for about six 
months, and ended with the emergence of a de facto independent – although 
unrecognized by the international community – regime in the eastern part of the Republic 
of Moldova, the so-called “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic.”14 Fought over a pro-
Russian region called Transnistria, the conflict was the culmination of frictions and 
interactions involving the entire range of factors that normally fuel intra-state conflicts: 
ethno-linguistic and national identity strife and Romanian irredentism and Great-Russian 
chauvinism.15 In fact, all these factors started shaking Moldova in 1989 as a result of 
President Gorbachev’s policy of political openness and the restructuring of the Soviet 
Union. All these problems at the republics’ level were aggravated by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. For indigenous politicians, who assumed the leadership of the newly 
emerged independent Republic of Moldova, it became a test in matters of state-building, 
governance, identification of roles, and the status of ethnic minorities within the future 
independent Republic of Moldova, which the central government in Chisinau failed to 
pass in the early 1990s. 
 
                                                 
13 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 128. 
14 The self-proclaimed, unrecognized republic in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova appears 
under slightly different names in various sources. The one presented in the text is the author’s direct 
translation from Russian (Preednyestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika).  
15 Trevor Waters, “Russian Peacekeeping In Moldova: Source Of Stability Or Neo-Imperialist 
Threat?” in  Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping, ed. John Mackinlay and Peter 




Figure 1. The Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.16  
 
The Transnistrian conflict was seen by many in the West as a painful outcome of 
an imprudent strategy chosen by Moldovan state-builders in the circumstances existing at 
that time. The lack of a clear vision of Moldovan statehood, and a failure to formulate the 
fundamental principles on which the future independent Republic of Moldova would 
reside, resulted in violent confrontations. Society needed a core, around which the future 
state was supposed to be built. Radical in nature, pro-Romanian language laws adopted in 
1989 could not serve the purpose of such a core and have only provoked anxiety amongst 
non-Moldovans. Language is a powerful element in unifying nations, but it needs a 
political context, or support of other state institutions. In Hagen Schulze’s words, the true 
national identity can emerge only as a result of the combination of “two views of the 
nation – the subjective, political view of the French Revolution, and the objective,  
 
                                                 
16 Source: Federation of American Scientists webpage. Last accessed in January 2006 at: 
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/mo-md.htm. 
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cultural view of German Romanticism.”17 None of the state institutions existing or 
emerging in the early 1990s in Moldova – parliament, presidency, government, army, etc. 
– could provide such support.  
Moldova followed the same path, from a province of a big empire (the Soviet 
Union) to an independent nation-state, as most nation-states that emerged in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In fact, the process started with a cultural revival of Moldovans in the 
late 1980s, followed by ideas of a Kulturnation,18 largely propagated by pro-Romanian 
forces. These forces were made up of indigenous intelligentsia who declared the 
unification with Romania as the only logical, culturally- and historically-driven outcome 
for Moldova. Under the banner of a Kulturnation, the indigenous political establishment 
emerged. 
After the Transnistrian conflict, Moldovan state-builders realized that shifting the 
emphasis from cultural principles of state-building to political ones – i.e., building a state 
based on the Constitution – would have worked out much better. It would have 
accommodated all ethnicities, but, more important, all political groups. Unfortunately, 
that understanding and disposition for tolerance amongst Moldovans came through blood 
and soil. The society was already extremely polarized and divided by a “separation zone” 
– a term used in peacekeeping operations. 
Today’s Republic of Moldova had never been an independent state in the past19 
within the borders proclaimed on 27 August 1991, after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. At different times throughout history, the lands of today’s Moldova were 
absorbed by different empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Great Romania, 
etc.) that emerged and disappeared on the Eurasian continent.20 The controversial past of 
the country has generated debates over the true identity of Moldovans as an independent 
                                                 
17 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations And Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996), 158. 
18 Ivan Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 145.   
19 After the collapse of Tsarist Empire in 1917, followed by Socialist Revolution in Russia, Bessarabia 
declared independence and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Moldova. Very soon after, however, the 
republic united with Romania and became a province of “Greater Romania.” For details, see King, The 
Moldovans and Dima, Bessarabia And Bukovina, 32. 
20 For more than three centuries (1538-1812), Moldova was part of the Ottoman Empire that expanded 
into Asia as well as into Europe up to the borders of today’s Bosnia and Germany. 
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nation. Unfortunately, Bessarabia has failed to play the role of a unifying region for the 
Republic of Moldova,21 as England played in the fate of Great Britain, or the Castile 
region played in Spain’s cultural integration.22 
This thesis does not intend to re-tell the history of two regions, Bessarabia and 
Transnistria, which formed in 1940 – under supervision of Soviet policy-makers – the 
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (one of fifteen satellite republics of former 
U.S.S.R.). This job has been beautifully done by Charles King in his book, The 
Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, and also by Nicolas Dima in 
his account, Bessarabia and Bukovina. Eastern European Monographs.23 These are just 
two of many other excellent works that thoroughly describe the roots of the existing 
difference between two regions: Bessarabia and Transnistria. 
It remains clear today that if Moldovan leaders paid more attention, in the late 
1980s–early 1990s, to the history of these two regions, events would have probably 
followed a different path. It could have been foreseen back in 1991 that two regions, 
glued together by Soviet state-crafters in the late 1940s, would break in pieces again, 
sooner or later. Donald L. Horowitz suggested that “if it is impossible for groups to live 
together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than 
one homogeneous state, even if this necessitates population transfers.”24 That approach 
can be applied to any other conflict except Transnistrian. Transnistria was far from being 
a homogeneous region25 before 1992. Neither was the rest of the country (Bessarabia). It 
is true that in the late 1980s–early 1990s, pro-nationalist forces attempted to marginalize 
                                                 
21 While having failed to integrate Transnistria, Moldova has been used by the EU as a model of 
ethnic-territorial autonomy for the Gagauz minority living in the south of the country. Quoted from Trevor 
Waters, “Russian peacekeeping in Moldova,” 152. 
22 Schulze, 125. 
23 See King, The Moldovans and Dima, Bessarabia And Bukovina. 
24 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 
588. 
25 According to the Soviet census held in 1989 the Transnistrian region had the follow up ethnic 
composition: Moldovans 39,9%; Ukrainians 28.3%; Russians 25,5%; See Table 10 in Charles King, The 
Moldovans, 185. Although migration after the conflict slightly changed the ethnic composition of the 
region, even today Transnistria remains a heterogeneous region. 
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and eventually squeeze off Moldova’s Russian-speaking population.26 There is no 
evidence of that phenomenon taking place today. The same can not be said of pro-
Russian separatist authorities’ attitudes towards Moldovans living in Transnistria.  
In the years following the end of violence in Transnistria, scholars of intra-state 
conflicts analyzed the real causes of the conflict.27 It is widely acknowledged today that 
the real cause of the Transnistrian conflict was not the ordinary people on both sides of 
Nistru28 River who did not want to live together. The conflict erupted because there were 
people in the orbits of power, holding administrative positions in Transnistrian counties 
(rayon29) and small towns of Soviet Moldova, who opposed sharing the power in a newly 
proclaimed independent Republic of Moldova, and giving up their privileged positions. 
Since these people could not openly admit the real cause of their opposition – the struggle 
for more power, wealth and independence from outside control – they decided to play the 
history card as the fuel for conflict and resistance.  
Although a cease-fire agreement was signed in the summer of 1992,30 a political 
level confrontation is still in place and gets worse as time goes by. The separatist regime 
has consolidated considerably over the years, developed all necessary state institutions 
(army, police, banking system, etc.) and, de facto, is an independent state. Adepts of 
realism theory of international relations would say it is quite normal that people in control 
of even thin strips of land would want to be independent and have their own states. 
Kosovo and Chechnya are just two additional examples.  
                                                 
26 In spite of Moscow’s accusations and complains on discrimination of ethnic Russians in Moldova, 
anti-Russian moods in Moldova have never reached the proportions of similar feelings still persisting in 
Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). Russian politicians tend to ignore that reality in negotiations with 
Moldova over Transnistria. 
27 For a thorough analysis of causes of the Transnistrian conflict see Kaufman, Spiraling to Interethnic 
War. 
28 In this paper the author intentionally uses the original name of the river Nistru, known and used by 
Moldovans and Romanians. In different sources in the West, though, the river appears under its Russian 
designation Dnestr (Dniestr, Dniester). 
29 Rayon. Administrative-territorial unit in the former Soviet Union equivalent to a county (or canton) 
in some countries. 
30 “The Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniestr 
Region of the Republic of Moldova” was signed in Moscow on 21 July 1992 by Moldovan President 
Mircea Snegur and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin. 
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With such disparate views on their future, both parties came to the negotiations 
table in 1992. The main reason people agree to talk is to stop the violence at a certain 
point in time and place. Moldova was not an exception. However, as in many similar 
cases, conflicting parties were aware that they were engaging in a complicated 
negotiations process that may stretch over many years. Roy Licklider argues that 
negotiated settlements are deemed to fail because different factors drive rivaling parties 
to: negotiate, reach agreement, and implement these agreements. Therefore, negotiated 
settlements are always second-best solutions for both parties.31 
The first one for Transnistrian leaders in 1992 was (and still remains) full and 
unconditional independence. The first and best option for the central government in 
Chisinau, in 1992, was an independent, united Moldova without any autonomous regions 
in its composition. Even today, gaining full control over the territory of the country 
remains the most important stake in negotiations. In this stalemate reconciliation of both 
parties appears hardly possible.  
Negotiations have always been the most challenging endeavor for diplomats and 
politicians. Logically, each party tries to get the most out of negotiations. Wording in 
inter-state agreements and treaties can affect the evolution of relations between nations 
for years. Due to incompetence or intentional moves of some Moldovan leaders in 
negotiations over the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, Russian negotiators 
managed to secure a prolonged Russian military presence in the region. This was 
accomplished via the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Republic of 
Moldova on judicial status, ways and dates for withdrawal of Russian Federation 
military units, temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.32 They 
conditioned the withdrawal of troops upon a political resolution of Transnistrian disputes. 
In other words, withdrawal of Russia’s 14th Army units from Transnistria was supposed 
                                                 
31 Roy Licklider, “Obstacles to Peace Settlements,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing 
International Conflict, ed. C.A. Crooker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 699.  
32 Translation of the agreement name from Romanian given by the author. The Agreement was signed 
on 21 October 1994 by Moldovan Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli and Russian Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdyn. 
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to be synchronized33 with the progress in the determination of the Transnistria’s final 
status. Regrettably for Moldova, the lack of skilled diplomats allowed Russia to set up 
several other “diplomatic traps” in different bilateral agreements34 signed between the 
Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation throughout the 1990s. 
Besides strong political backup, Russia has never, since 1992, ceased its 
economic assistance to the separatist regime. 35 Every conflict has an economic basis 
which nurtures belligerent groups and keeps the conflict going. The constant flow of 
resources from Russia has been (and still is) one of the drives for this particular conflict. 
Needless to say, Transnistrian leaders control a lion’s share of Soviet Moldova’s 
industrial base. 
In the meantime, developments in other post-conflict zones like Kosovo were 
producing outcomes that weakened the positions of the Moldovan government in 
negotiations and, at the same time, added more arguments in support to the legitimacy of 
the Transnistrian regime. The international community (including UN, OSCE, and other 
IGOs and NGOs) has intervened into internal affairs of a de jure sovereign state, Serbia, 
and is very close to supporting the secession of a de facto separatist regime in Kosovo. 
Although Mohammed Ayoob argues that the Kosovo case should be regarded as an 
exception,36 in reality it was seen and interpreted as a convenience for sympathizers. In 
fact, it spurred more confidence amongst leaders of other separatist regimes – like 




                                                 
33 Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Politica Externă a Republicii Moldova (The Foreign Policy of the Republic 
of Moldova), 2nd edition (Chisinau: CIVITAS, 2001), 139. Romanian. 
34 Fourteen years after the conflict Moldova signed some over twenty bilateral normative documents 
with Russia. 
35 The Center for European Security Studies, NOSTRUM (Needs and Options for Security-sector 
Transparency and Reform in Ukraine and Moldova) Workshop Report, Tools for Reform and Decision-
Making in Defense and Security (Groningen, Netherlands, 1-2 April 2005), 21. Last accessed in January 
2006 at: www.let.rug.nl/cess.. 
36 Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. C.A. Crooker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001). 
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International organizations (UN and OSCE), in turn, have proved ineffective for 
conflict settlement in a number of other crises besides Kosovo (Rwanda, Bosnia, etc.). 
The following section presents an assessment of the performance of external mediators in 
the Transnistrian dispute.  
 
B. EXTERNAL MEDIATORS 
The format for negotiations over the future status of the Transnistrian region was 
set up before the violence broke out. Logically, Moldova’s next-door neighbors, Romania 
and the Ukraine, were two players interested in security and stability across their borders, 
so was the regional hegemon Russia. Initially, Transnistria was not invited to the 
negotiations table as an independent actor. In Chisinau, that was seen as recognition of 
Tiraspol as a state-level actor, a step that could begin the process of eventual 
legitimization. R. Licklider suggests that it is a normal temptation on behalf of legitimate 
governments to leave out extremists and separatists in negotiations.37 He goes further by 
stating that this is the flawed approach and that “it is important to make every effort to 
include all the major groups involved in the conflict, particularly at first.”38 That is the 
so-called principle of inclusiveness in the practice of conflict settlement. So, this theory 
suggests that the appearance of Transnistrians at the negotiations table was unavoidable 
and that the central government could do little, in fact, to prevent that from happening. 
1. Guarantor-States 
Many studies on the Transnistrian conflict outline Moldova’s neighbors, Romania 
and Ukraine, as key players in the conflict resolution process.39 Of course, since both 
nations share portions of their borders with the Republic of Moldova, both would have 
security and economic considerations at stake in the resolution of the Transnistrian issue. 
It seems logical that the struggle of legitimate authorities against territorial separatism in 
a neighboring country must be given a priority in the political agenda of Romanian and 
Ukrainian leaderships. It is also true that both nations have ethnic ties in the Republic of 
Moldova. At different points in history, Romania, as well as Ukraine, had exercised 
                                                 
37 Licklider, 701.  
38 Ibid. 
39 NOSTRUM, 18.; For additional evidence see Cojocaru,  77-79.  
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control over parts of today’s Republic of Moldova. Both have their stories and reasons to 
believe in the validity of their claims over Bessarabia and Transnistria respectively.40 
However, none of these countries has enough capabilities to stand against Russia. 
Limited state capacity and fragile state institutions did not allow them to curb Russia’s 
interest in an extended military presence in Transnistria.  
It could be foreseen, back in 1992, from a realism theory point of view, Russia 
would try to further consolidate its positions in negotiations to the detriment of Moldova. 
Whereas Ukraine was seen as a cooperative partner and an easy target to conquer, 
Romania had to be squeezed out of the negotiations format as soon as possible. Russian 
diplomacy decided to do this with Moldova’s hands. For Moldovan leaders, the stake in 
this deal was the end of bloodshed and for Russia to exclude Romania from the 
negotiations process and bring Moldova back into the orbits of Russian influence. 
Adopted by Moldovan leadership, the decision has significantly distanced Moldova from 
the West, and determined the fate of negotiations. It was, however, the most reasonable 
decision – stopping the violence – at that point in time for those in power.41 
In contrast to Romania, which has been a visible supporter of Moldova all these 
years, and a strong militant against Transnistrian separatism and the presence of Russian 
troops in the Eastern part of Moldova, Ukraine has adopted a quite ambiguous position 
towards the conflict. While, at the beginning, supporting the legitimate Moldovan 
authorities and integrity of the Republic of Moldova, Ukrainian leaders soon (in 1992) 
added expressions like “Transnistrian people” and “Ukrainian land” to their lexicon.42 
With tacit approval of Ukrainian authorities, Transnistrian separatists have been 
smuggling their “goods” across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.43 The final destination 
of those “goods” remains a subject of investigation by the international community. A 
pro-Western government that came to power in Kiev after the presidential elections in the 
                                                 
40 On this topic Charles King offers an objective analysis of Romanian and Ukrainian influence in 
Moldova. See King, The Moldovans and Dima, Bessarabia And Bukovina. For more on Ukraine’s 
influence and connections with Moldova see Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, second 
edition (New Haven and London: Yale Nota Bene and Yale University Press, 2002). 
41 Cojocaru, 109.  
42 Ibid., 105. 
43 NOSTRUM, 21.  
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fall of 2004 has promised to change Ukraine’s attitude towards the Transnistrian 
problem. However, the gap between official declarations and practical measures on the 
ground widens as time goes by. The Ukraine plan for conflict resolution, proposed in 
May 2005, favored elections in the region’s legislature as soon as possible without 
removing Transnistrian President Igor Smirnov and his entourage from key positions.44 
So far, reality shows that conflicting interests of guarantor-states has led to the 
emergence of a series of “veto” groups within the governments, impeding the problem-
solving process. It is unnecessary to list all the violations of international laws and norms 
committed in Transnistria with the support of neighboring Ukraine. Today, means of 
communication and information exchange have reached a high level of ramification and 
anybody can obtain enough evidence from a variety of open sources. 
However, there is a belief that the behavior of states tends to change within strong 
alliances.45 Both Romania and Ukraine can assume a leading role in negotiations between 
conflicting parties, having the alliance support. Moreover, this should be an alliance 
where Russia is not a member as well. NATO and the EU fall under this category. The 
potential problem arising here is that even having alliance backup neither Romania nor 
the Ukraine can assume sponsorship responsibility over Moldova as West Germany did 
after unification with East Germany. In 1989 the EU put the entire burden linked to the 
adaptation of East Germany to Western standards on the shoulders of Federal German 
Republic. 
2. International Organizations 
So, in the initial four-sided format – Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and Russia – the 
balance of power was already not in favor of Moldova. Although all these countries were 
suffering the effects of transition from an authoritarian system to a democracy, Russia 
easily outweighed the others. The liberal institutionalism theory of international relations 
would suggest that small countries like Moldova should bring in any of the largest 
international organizations and alliances. As such, Moldovans launched appeals early on 
                                                 
44 In May 2005 Ukraine proposed its plan for the Transnistrian conflict resolution which was supposed 
to start with internationally monitored elections in Transnistrian legislative Supreme Soviet. 
45 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4-5. 
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to all major organizations: United Nations,46 North-Atlantic Organization,47 and 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Unfortunately for 
Moldovans, neither NATO nor the EU sought a direct involvement in the Transnistrian 
dispute. The EU has relied on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
which established a permanent mission in Chisinau and a satellite office in Tiraspol, the 
capital of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. 
It turned out that the CSCE (later OSCE) was the only international organization 
that responded to the appeals of the Moldovan government and remained, up until late 
2005, the only organization actively involved in the negotiations process. Thirteen years 
of the OSCE mediation have not produced positive outcomes in negotiations. OSCE is 
criticized for ineffectiveness. Could this organization do better in Moldova than it did? A 
look inside the organization’s structure and decision-making process can unveil some of 
the OSCE’s capabilities and shortfalls. First of all, decisions adopted by the OSCE 
member-states are political but not legally binding. That leaves the organization without 
any leverage or any enforcing mechanism over its members. Accusing a nation (in the 
case of Transnistria – Russia) for not “displaying enough political” will to fulfill its 
obligations sounds different from accusing the same nation for violations [emphasized by 
the author] of international laws and treaties. Initially, OSCE was designed as a forum 
that was supposed to bring West and East European nations together. The forum was 
open for any nation who voluntarily wanted to participate in discussions on issues of 
common interest. Under OSCE auspices countries bargain over different deals in 
international relations but they do not form intergovernmental, transnational alliances 
which would restrain other members’ behavior through a set of norms and rules. 
Secondly, the basic principle of the OSCE decision-making process is by 
consensus. Although this principle underscores equality of its members and reflects the 
cooperative approach to all addressed issues, it is not hard to imagine that, in an 
organization with 55 member-states, this principle slows the decision-making process and 
                                                 
46 On 31 July, 1992, President of the Republic of Moldova Mircea Snegur officially asked the then UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to consider the possibility of deploying a UN observers mission 
to the Transnistrian region. For details, see Cojocaru, 86. 
47 The issue of Transnistrian conflict was addressed to the NATO’ Political Committee on 2 April 
1992, following the outbreak of the violence. For more details see Cojocaru, 81. 
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leads to stalemates in disputes over sensitive issues. In 1992, however, OSCE adopted 
two mechanisms that were supposed to be used in case of deadlocks: “consensus minus 
one”48 and “consensus minus two.”49 These two mechanisms gave OSCE the flexibility 
to adopt decisions without the consent of the State (or two States respectively) concerned 
in “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments.”50 The 
“consensus minus one” was used once against former Yugoslavia. The “consensus minus 
two” was never used. Why hasn’t this mechanism ever been used? Perhaps another 
consensus had to be reached on what could be called “cases of clear, gross and 
uncorrected violations.” In a situation when much worse confrontations (like the conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region) have not qualified 
as being “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations,” Moldova’s complaints about 
violations in Transnistria had little chance (if any at all) of being considered and 
addressed.  
Could OSCE provide a strong political back-up for the Republic of Moldova after 
all? It becomes clear, even after such a superficial analysis, that OSCE should not be 
blamed for failing to live up to the expectations of Moldovans. 
At the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia committed itself to dismantle its 
military bases and withdraw its troops from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova by the 
end of the year 2002. It remains a fact today that Russia did not keep the promise. All 
following OSCE summits have failed to pursue Russia to meet the assumed in Istanbul 
obligations and ended up with a decision “to hold another summit.” This failure indicated 
a lack of real progress on issues like Abkhazia51 and Transnistria. After 1999, Russia 
started to behave more aggressively. What happened? Obviously the upturn in Russia’s 
economic development and stabilization of political life – since 1999 inevitably linked 
with President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power – can explain such a change. Russia’s 
superpower ambitions did not vanished after dismemberment of the Soviet Union, but 
were put on hold for the period of turmoil and adjustment to new post-Cold War realities. 
                                                 
48 Adopted at the Prague CSCE Ministerial Council meeting, held in January 1992. 
49 Adopted in 1992 in Stockholm. 
50 OSCE Handbook, 15. Last accessed in January 2006 at: http://www.osce.org/item/13858.html. 
51 Formerly an autonomous Soviet republic administratively integrated into Soviet Georgia. 
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OSCE presence in Moldova counts amongst the reasons that can explain why the 
UN has never deployed an observer mission to the Transnistrian region. As long as 
OSCE was present in the area, the UN was not considering intervening in Transnistria. 
Especially since OSCE had declared, in the early 1990s, that it would play a role of a 
regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.52 The UN, in turn, 
has welcomed the idea, and even encouraged the resolution of any disputes and conflicts 
at the regional level.53  That is the official UN policy.  
In reality, one peculiarity that united all UN peacekeeping operations in the past 
could better explain the UN refusal to intervene in Moldova. The UN did not want to get 
involved in areas where one of the superpowers, Russia, had clear, direct interests. 
Traditionally, UN peacekeeping was used on the periphery of the Cold War “battles,” 
where the United States and the Soviet Union did not have vested interests. This 
unwritten rule was still fresh in the minds of Russian diplomats in 1992. Russia as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council (and direct successor of the Soviet 
Union) would not tolerate the emergence of another UN mission in its backyard. In 
exchange, Russia rushed to offer a kind of regional arrangement recommended in 
Chapter VI54 of the UN Charter. Since Russia had a full control over the events and 
development, it intervened “just in time,” i.e., before the UN could qualify the conflict as 
one that “endangered the maintenance of international peace and security.”55 
In the meantime, UN peacekeeping itself was at a major turning point in its 
evolution.56 UN “traditional” approaches to conflict settlement were failing to cope with 
the wave of inter-ethnic clashes erupting one after another in the former communist  
 
 
                                                 
52 It must be mentioned here that at the time OSCE declared its intention to play the role of the UN 
“regional arrangements” it did not have any capabilities at all to conduct peacekeeping operations. Only 
NATO has had (and still remains the most advanced institution) integrated military structures, capable of 
carrying-out peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions mandated by the United Nations. 
53 See UN Charter, Chapter VIII “Regional Arrangements.” Last accessed in January 2006 at: 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. 
54 UN Charter, art. 33. Last accessed in January 2006 at: www.un.org . 
55 UN Charter, art. 33. Last accessed in January 2006 at: www.un.org. 
56 Mackinlay and Cross, 4. 
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countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, UN failures to prevent genocides 
in Rwanda and Srebrenica were adding points to the legitimacy of Russian peacekeeping 
in Transnistria. 
With four guarantors-states and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe involved in the mediation business, one could have an impression that the 
Transnistrian issue was important for a large number of actors. In reality the “frozen” 
conflict gradually became nobody’s priority in the West. Places of low strategic value, 
like Moldova, were always at the greatest risk of being left alone and forgotten. 
Whenever there is a clear-cut interest in a region (as defined by the U.S. Department of 
State in respect to Georgia,57) the West can lobby in the UN over the question to deploy 
an observer mission. Of course, the threat emanating from Transnistria was not 
commensurable at the time with the one in Afghanistan under the Taliban or in Iraq under 
Hussein. However, it is less costly to prevent the problem at the earliest stage than to 
engage it when it is too late and things get much more complicated. Conflicts, like the 
Transnistrian one, don’t matter until they matter. However, decisions to intervene in one 
“hot spot” or another are always political and are not based on the situation on the ground 
alone. Predicting when decisions in favor of Moldova would be made is extremely 
difficult. It is a constant dilemma: what comes first – the interest or the value?  
Assuming that UN deployed its peacekeepers to Moldova, what changes could 
UN-led (or any other international organization) peacekeeping force bring to the conflict 
resolution? Not many. UN proved to be, by and large, ineffective in meeting Paul Diehl’s 
second criterion – resolve the conflict.58 No peacekeeping operation could do more than 
limit the armed conflict. However paradoxical it may sound, in some cases, a return to 
colonialism or imperialism seems to be a better solution for the recovery and 
development of conflicting countries, better than the deployment and meaningless 
presence of UN troops. At least in the past, former dominions had vested interests in 
                                                 
57 U.S. policy towards Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, for instance, is saying that “it is in U.S. interest 
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maintaining stability in controlled colonies in order to protect investments. Today’s UN 
peacekeeping became a business for many Third World countries. The major interest for 
these soldiers is to bring cash to the budget of their countries. The fate of the hosting 
nation becomes less important. Given the interests of Russian (and Moldovan to some 
extent) business elite in the region, Russian peacekeeping operation in Transnistria 
appears to be a better protection shield.  
 
C. RUSSIAN TROOPS IN TRANSNISTRIA: PEACEKEEPERS OR 
COLONIALIST GARRISON? 
The Soviet troops’ withdrawal from Eastern Europe has ended the threat posed by 
Soviet Union offensive conventional forces. Furthermore, the democratization process 
that started in Russia in the early 1990s, although with significant deficiencies and 
deviations from Western norms, has reduced the danger posed by aggressive intentions.  
Since the end of military confrontations in Transnistria, Russia’s pressure on the 
Moldovan government has steadily increased. Once Russia’s economy started to show 
signs of improvement, Moscow became more vocal in expressing concerns about 
Russia’s relative power in world politics. By all possible means, Russia has created a 
kind of security regime in Transnistria in the sense of regimes theory of international 
relations.59 Moldova’s consent was not needed in this case since the deal was cut with 
other powerful actors who agreed to the established status quo. At that point in time, it 
was an option that the West seemed willing to support. Moldovan leadership has been 
forced to play by the rules of this regime. 
The strength of Russian troops remaining in Transnistria after the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union did not present a real threat to the neighboring countries, Romania 
and the Ukraine. However, since these troops were stationed in the area not controlled by 
the legitimate Moldovan government, the presence of these forces was seen as a 
disturbing and destabilizing factor. 
Russia kept proudly declaring over the last decade that its peacekeeping troops, 
present in Transnistria since the cease-fire agreement was signed, have been able to bring 
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peace and stability to the region and maintain it ever since. That is true. It is also true that 
this is a quite common practice for outsiders (as Russia is in its capacity of guarantor-
state) to invest in enterprises that have clearly visible effect and a blown-out resonance in 
the international mass-media. The argument of “successful peacekeeping” has been 
ostensibly exploited by Russian propagandists in Transnistria, especially against the 
background of failed UN-led peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world (Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Bosnia). Not only on the left bank of the Nistru River, but on the right one 
as well, was the local population willingly buying this argument. That is understandable, 
since most people, even far beyond Moldovan borders, expect no more from a 
peacekeeping operation than just stopping the violence and preventing the recidivism. 
Paul Diehl argued in his book “International Peacekeeping” that it is logical for the 
success of a peacekeeping operation to be judged on its ability to deter or prevent the re-
emergence of violence in the area of conflict.60 However, Diehl emphasizes that 
peacekeepers should not rely on an overwhelming force “to deter or prevent violence,” 
but rather should rely on “their moral or symbolic value as an international force 
representing the world community’s desire for peace.”61 Likewise, those who were in 
power in Moldova in 1992 were thinking about peacekeeping in Westphalian terms. That 
is to say, up to the 1990s, “blue berets” were seen “settling disputes and orderly relations 
between states62 using mostly soft tools and methods (preventive diplomacy, mediation in 
negotiations process, etc.). Basically, Westphalian, or traditional peacekeeping, was 
concerned with stopping the violence and paving the way for further negotiations.  
The concept of “peacekeeping” changed a lot over the 1990s and moved closer to 
the second criterion identified by Paul Diehl as a measuring tool of success – conflict 
resolution.63 It goes further than the dismantling of authoritarian, totalitarian and other 
types of despotic regimes, to building democratic institutions and creating conditions for 
democracy’s consolidation. That is the post-Westphalian concept of peacekeeping64 
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using Bellamy’s terminology. This approach entails the most powerful argument against 
Russia’s claims of success in Transnistria. Restoration of peace is not enough. It is a 
short-run success, but does not bring sustainable peace in the long-run. Security and 
freedom of movement of every individual within rival entities must have been ensured 
and become the first priority. When Transnistrian law enforcement forces were 
obstructing Moldovan farmers, living on the left bank of Nistru, from harvesting their 
crops, and when Moldovan children, living in Transnistria, could not go to school for the 
same reason, Russian peacekeepers did nothing to stop the separatists. What kind of 
security could they (Russian peacekeepers) possibly claim to provide? 
In sum, the post-Westphalian concept would have suggested that if the 
peacekeeping operation in Transnistria “implanted seeds of liberal-democratic statehood” 
the conflict would have been most probably solved by now. If Mr. Smirnov, President of 
the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, accepted democracy as “the only 
game in town,” preconditions for the conflict recidivism would have gradually 
disappeared. With the consent of both parties, democracy would have had a chance for a 
long life, and peace and stability in the region would have endured. That is the 
fundamental principle of the Democratic Peace Theory – democracies do not fight each 
other.65 
In 1992, however, it was doubtful that Moldovan politicians were focusing on the 
principles of the Democratic Peace Theory when they opted for an external intervention. 
Stopping the bloodshed was the first priority. With Moldova’s consent, Russian 
peacekeepers showed up in Transnistria. Russians lacked a democratic tradition and 
culture. Even if they wanted, they could do no more than merely disengage the 
belligerent parties. So, as mentioned above, Russian troops created a security regime 
around Transnistria, a kind of status quo. 
Unfortunately for Moldovans, it seems that the existing status quo of “no peace, 
no war” in the Transnistrian region satisfied the West all these years. In the meantime, 
this false “stability” allowed Russia to claim that the presence of its peacekeeping forces 
in the region was indispensable. Over the years, however, the real face of Russian 
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peacekeeping has surfaced. It is sad to see this happening since it is widely 
acknowledged, by the European Union and NATO policy-makers, that peacekeeping in 
post-modern era (post-Westphalian) terms encompasses more than merely disengaging 
belligerent parties.  
In the early 1990s, however, Moldovan leaders followed the world’s most 
common practices of conflict resolution – involving the United Nations Organization 
peacekeepers. Never since then has the idea to invite an international peacekeeping force 
been abandoned. Taking into account Russia’s interests in the region, Moldova does not 
suggest entirely replacing the existing Russian peacekeepers, but, rather, diversifying the 
national composition of peacekeepers. The peculiar Russian concept of peacekeeping, 
developed specifically for former Soviet republics, significantly deviates from 
international principles and doctrines on peacekeeping. Although OSCE military 
observers in Transnistria have been doing a fairly good job in documenting the 
performance of Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Russian peacekeepers remain, by and large, 
unaccountable to the international community and, in some cases, even to their 
government in Moscow.66 Their behavior towards the central government in Chisinau is 
worse than that of military units stationed in Moldova during the Soviet times. Unlike the 
Russian peacekeepers deployed in other post-conflict zones, namely the Balkans, those 
stationed in Transnistria are out of reach of the EU observers. In this context, Trevor 
Waters argues in his analysis of Russian peacekeeping in Transnistria that Russian 
peacekeeping “is not so much a source of regional stability as rather more a neo-
imperialist threat that has prolonged the conflict and, in so doing, blocked the 
strengthening of Moldova’s independence and restoration of its territorial integrity.”67 
 
D. WHAT HAS MOLDOVA DONE SO FAR IN RESPECT TO THE 
TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT? 
According to Max Weber, one of the characteristics of the state is its territory.68 
Weber argued that a state is an organization that wields power over people and territory. 
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In other words, the state is defined by a certain territory within which governments 
exercise the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”69 If one applies this 
criterion to the Republic of Moldova, then it can be concluded that Moldovans have 
failed the test on state-building. Never since independence had official Chisinau fully 
controlled the entire territory enclosed within the boundaries it proclaimed as state 
frontiers in August 1991.70 The eastern part of the country along the left bank of the 
Nistru River did not recognize the legitimacy of the central government in Chisinau and 
remained under the control of local authorities. It can be argued, though, that the 
population in Transnistria has never been given the possibility to express their allegiance 
to central government. All attempts by Chisinau to have population of the Transnistrian 
region participate in elections were being obstructed by the separatist regime. 
Throughout the 1990s, Moldovan authorities were looking for political solutions 
to the conflict, solutions that were supposed to accommodate interests groups on both 
sides of the buffer zone. Chisinau can be blamed by Transnistrian leaders for anything 
but for disregarding one of the most important principles of post-conflict settlement – 
inclusiveness. Although this intention was secured in the first Moldovan Constitution 
(adopted in 1994), on the ground it was not an easy task. First and foremost, Chisinau had 
to agree to a single strategy towards the future status of Transnistria, and to speak with 
one voice. In order to achieve that uniformity, all political parties had to reach a 
consensus.  
As such, Chisinau agreed to grant large autonomy to the Transnistrian region. 
There was a significant change in Chisinau’s official position towards Transnistria. 
Gradually Moldova moved from the concept of a unitary state to a loose federation with 
Transnistria.71 Approaching the option from realism theory prospective, Transnistrian 
leaders wanted to secure as much autonomy for the region as possible. Tiraspol was 
willing to accept either a symmetrical federation, confederation, or complete partition. A 
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symmetrical federation was acceptable for the central government in Chisinau with some 
exceptions. In the version of federation proposed by Chisinau, Transnistria was supposed 
to get enough autonomy and space to maneuver. Other options could not be acceptable by 
either party in the negotiations, especially by Russia and the Ukraine. Both countries 
were still struggling with their own territorial separatism movements (Chechnya in 
Russia and Crimea in the Ukraine). For Moldova, symmetrical federation was a serious 
concession. Russia had jumped on this opportunity to secure one more time, and, 
hopefully (for Russia), for the last time, its extended military presence in Transnistria. 
A 2004 Moscow-brokered plan, termed by people in Moldova and beyond its 
borders as the “Kozak” Memorandum,” was supposed to extend the presence of Russian 
troops in the Republic of Moldova for another twenty years or so; it was rejected by 
Moldovan leadership and was shelved. 
In spite of the stalemate in the Transnistrian dispute, life on the right bank of the 
Nistru River went on. Moldova continued to build its democratic institutions in 
accordance with Western standards. However, in contrast to old established democracies, 
Moldova, as many other countries of the Third World, was struggling to democracy 
within a different international environment. It took approximately three centuries for 
most West European democracies to pass through the process of state-building – from 
nation to nation-state and then to states. Moldova, in contrast, found itself under time 
pressure in promoting democratic reforms set by the West. That fact can not be 
considered as an excuse for the relatively modest progress in building workable 
democratic institutions. However, as Mohammed Ayoob72 argued in his account “State 
Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” this kind of “encouragement,” exercised by 
Western democracies, can result in state collapse. In addition, Western democracies  
impose quite high human rights standards, which are not always suitable for young 
democracies like Moldova. In the consolidation process, there is a need for a heavy hand 
and tough policies.  
But the most important drawback of Moldovan politicians in negotiations with 
Transnistrian leadership was (and still is) the fact that official Chisinau has failed to come 
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up with an ideology that could have been more attractive for the population on the left 
bank of the Nistru River and, most importantly, could have been strong enough to 
withstand the communist ideology successfully used by those who controlled Transnistria 
all these years. Sending patriotic messages across the Nistru River was not going to bring 
serious dividends. A viable economic dimension had to support the political strategy of 
the country. A good example here, and a reference in the history, would be the U.S.-led 
Marshall Plan. Besides economic benefits that this plan promised to Europe, it was seen 
as a “psychological offensive” on the Soviet system. The old bureaucracy has managed to 
secure its positions within governmental institutions for quite a long period since 
independence. The conservation of old principles of state-management was inhibiting the 
emergence of new ideas. It was a resemblance of a “dual society” discussed by Ivan 
Berend in one of his books on pre – World War II Eastern Europe.73 
And still, those who followed the evolution of the negotiations process over the 
Transnistrian conflict could have an impression that Moldovan leadership has 
overemphasized the issue. To some extent, this stalemate was a convenient excuse for 
any failures of the elected politicians to improve the country’s economy. Roy Licklider 
has quoted William Zartman, saying that: 
stalemate is not necessarily a bad outcome for parties; one may control the 
state apparatus and be able to gain some resources from its international 
connections, while the other may control a substantial part of state’s 
population and territory and run a shadow state, again benefiting those in 
control. Thus the elites of both sides may find stalemate a comfortable 
outcome, although it may be less attractive to those in whose name they 
govern.74  
You could make sound promises and, in the end, blame Transnistria as the main 
cause of the lack of success.  Juan Linz has defined this kind of situations as “unsolvable 
problems.”75 The problem will only get worse if governments set unrealistic goals for 
themselves. By linking everything with the Transnistrian problem, Moldova made herself 
a hostage to the separatist regime. Chisinau can do much on its own to ultimately 
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influence the fate of the dispute. Internal structural changes, optimization of state 
institutions, and improvement in the economic realm might have spillover effects. 
Another key cause of slow progress in negotiations with the Transnistrian regime, 
as identified by some political groups, was Moldova’s economic dependence on Russia 
(mainly dependence on energy resources). After the 2001 parliamentarian elections, the 
Moldovan communist party – which won the majority of seats in Moldovan legislature – 
used this fact to defend its pro-Russian electoral platform and eventual union with 
Belarus and Russia. Although state-ownership of the oil industry allows Russian leaders 
to easily convert the energetic dependency of some nations (especially in former Soviet 
republics) into a powerful political leverage,76 developments in other former Soviet 
republics proved that there are ways to overcome this obstacle. For example, Lithuania’s 
dependence on Russian oil77 is also quite high, but that did not obstruct the country’s 
integration in both NATO and the EU. The other two Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia, 
along with other EU candidate states, Romania and Bulgaria, also depend almost 100% 
on the gas imported from Russia.78  
 
E. CONCLUSION  
In summary, this chapter brings a few more arguments in support of Moldova’s 
current position that the existing format in negotiations over Transnistria is exhausted and 
outdated. It is widely acknowledged in the West today that Moldova needs a strong 
supporter in the negotiation process to counter-balance Russia, which openly backs the 
Transnistrian regime. So far, none of the involved guarantor-states could possibly provide 
this backup. The same can be said about international organizations. Neither the UN, 
where Russia, as a member of the Security Council, can block any decision that would 
harm its national interests, nor OSCE, whose decision-making process by consensus 
gives the same opportunity to its member-states, could provide a strong political support 
for the Republic of Moldova. 
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The UN tends to rely on OSCE as a regional player in post-conflict stabilization 
and reconstruction. Besides, the long-standing tradition to avoid involvement in areas 
where world superpowers have direct interests stopped the UN from getting involved in 
Transnistria. That and a few other factors played out in favor of Russia, which deployed 
its peacekeepers to the region. 
No matter what peacekeepers will deploy to Transnistria and no matter what 
mandate and rules of engagement they will have, they will have little chance (if any at 
all) to solve the root causes of the conflict. The UN does not have a single peacekeeping 
operation that solved the conflict in the long term.79 
New players should be given a try in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process. 
NATO and the EU are considered two potential candidates that can bring about changes 
in the negotiations process. Theoretically, either one of these two organizations taken 
separately possesses enough potential to create an asymmetry against Russia. Combined 
together, the efforts of both organizations, again theoretically, can significantly diminish 
Russia’s influence in the region. Would they go for this option?  
In the spring of 1992, when the violence was on its rise, NATO and CSCE80 
refused to intervene in Transnistria; motivating their decisions were the “insignificant 
proportions” of the conflict.81 Have considerations of NATO changed over time? What 
has the EU to say about Transnistria, and where does the issue stand in the long list of 
internal European problems? 
The next chapter will examine possible incentives that could push the North-
Atlantic Alliance and the European Union into a more active engagement in the 
Transnistrian conflict resolution process. Likewise, the chapter will identify the main 
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III. NATO AND THE EU: NEW ACTORS ON THE SCENE  
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the case of NATO, the alliance’s policies are heavily shaped by the United 
States. Opinions differ here as to what extent other NATO members are able to contain 
Washington and influence the Alliance’s courses of action and policies. Thomas Risse-
Kappen, for example, is among those who argue that, throughout the years of its 
existence, NATO has developed a collective identity and that “this sense of community 
helped the Europeans to influence American policies” through three mechanisms: timely 
consultations, domestic pressures within the U.S. and trans-governmental coalitions 
among societal and bureaucratic actors.”82 Proponents of regimes theory of international 
relations would support Risse-Kappen by arguing that, although a hegemonic nation (in 
this case, the United States) can fund a significant portion of a regime’s (NATO) budget, 
the regime can still handcuff the hegemony on some occasions.83 
On the other end of the spectrum are those who point to the unchecked hegemony 
of the United States, “the Pax Americana of a polity wielding more absolute power than 
any since ancient Rome.”84 Following recent developments within the North-Atlantic 
Alliance, one can notice a shift to unilateralism within the American political 
establishment. 
Within the European Union, on the other hand, Germany and France set the tone 
and influence the foreign policy formulation process. Of course, their influence within the 
EU is not commensurable to that exercised by the United States in NATO. Realists would 
say that they lack the necessary resources that would allow them to put pressure on other 
EU members. However, EU’s policy documents and doctrines in the defense area 
resemble the threat perception and crisis management approaches existing in these two 
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European nations. In fact, strong and close cooperation of these two nations, Germany 
and France, was the core for the European unification.  
So, we have two international organizations, NATO and the EU, whose 
intervention can speed up the Transnistrian conflict resolution process. The former was 
undergoing a transformation process throughout the 1990s, searching for a new identity 
and adjusting to modern realities. The latter one – the European Union – was on the rise. 
However fragile it is, the European Union (France and Germany) is competing with 
NATO (the U.S.) to win the hearts and minds of new NATO/EU members from Central 
and Eastern Europe. Rationale for further enlargement will be analyzed against “soft 
power” resources such as values, norms and knowledge,85 accumulated over the years 
and shared by member-states within both alliances. 
 
B. NATO – REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: STAKES FOR INTERVENTION IN 
THE TRANSNISTRIAN DISPUTE. 
1. Post–Cold War Intra-Alliance Developments  
To better understand the alliance’s behavior today, as an independent actor in 
world politics, a short survey of the alliance formation is needed. Likewise, intra-alliance 
cooperation and quarrels should add more to one’s understanding of how NATO works 
and makes decisions. In fact, conflict is embedded in the nature of any military alliance. 
In the past, a state’s decisions to form alliances were not necessarily accompanied by 
reciprocal sympathy. It was not uncommon for even rivaling countries to unite 
temporarily in an alliance in order to benefit from each other. 
The United States exited from World War II in much better shape than Europeans. 
After Germany was defeated, Americans wanted to withdraw from Europe. This intention 
was repeatedly stressed by U.S. governments after the war. Europeans, on the other hand, 
had an interest in an extended U.S. presence in Europe. As a result, Americans and 
Europeans cut a “win-win” deal. For Europeans, it was a great opportunity to use U.S. 
troops as a security guarantor on the continent and a deterring force against the Soviet 
threat. That gave them the chance to refrain from investing in rebuilding indigenous 
defense forces destroyed in WW II, but to direct resources to other spheres of the 
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economy. Secondly, Europeans had no incentive to build up large conventional forces 
because, in the end, they would have failed to outnumber U.S. forces. So, a buildup of 
indigenous forces would have not released them from dependency on the U.S. on security 
issues. America, in turn, sensed the opportunity to secure its positions in Europe after it 
exits (whenever this was going to happen). Amongst the first things Washington wanted 
to take care of was to prepare a suitable successor. If Europe was ever to unite in a kind 
of federation, then the United States would have probably liked Britain to take the lead in 
this community. Britain was seen in Washington as the best candidate to lead the others 
in a direction that was acceptable to the U.S., and also promote the values of liberal 
democracy on the European continent. As John Harper summarized, the predominating 
opinion within the American political establishment in late 1940s, Americans did not see 
themselves in “Britain’s place, but America and Britain side by side.”86 And besides, 
Americans needed at least one truthful, loyal ally amongst those “others.” In spite the fact 
that United States failed to impose the idea of British leadership on other European 
countries, American leadership was ready to propose a form of cooperation acceptable 
for all West European countries – the North-Atlantic Alliance. 
As previously noted, any military alliance is, from the outset of its formation, 
incompatible in nature. The North-Atlantic Alliance was not an exception. One could 
have doubted, back in 1945, that the world’s largest holders of colonies (France, Britain, 
Belgium and the Netherlands) would be able to form a lasting military alliance with the 
United States – the world’s fastest-growing economy. Increasing domestic consumption 
and demands for large social welfare programs in most European nations were conflicting 
with the future commitments to the alliance’s pool of military resources. As Wallace 
Thies characterized the predominating opinion in most European countries at that time, 
“every dollar, pound or franc not spent on defense is one that can be spent on programs 
that benefit large groups of voters, like pensioners or workers in depressed industries.”87  
Therefore, from the moment the Washington Treaty was signed in April 1949, the 
United States was quite aware that it would have to carry much of the North-Atlantic 
                                                 
86 John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 275. 
87 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining And Burden-Shifting In NATO (Armonk, New York: 
M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2003), 6. 
36 
Alliance burden. Whereas, on a political level, the decision to form an alliance was seen 
as a necessary step against the Soviet threat, on the level of practical implementation, 
things looked more problematic. Europeans have always been very hesitant to increase 
their commitments of resources to NATO.88 It was widely acknowledged in Europe (and 
still is) that United States would assume the bulk of the burden. In the meantime, U.S. 
policy-makers sensed the advantages that would accompany these arrangements. Besides 
providing a political-military framework and justification for U.S. military presence in 
Europe, the Washington Treaty established certain limits for European members of the 
alliance. Europeans, in their turn, could still use certain leverages (such as a commitment 
to timely consultations among members) to influence the decision-making process within 
the alliance. However, the allies’ success in influencing decisions was indirectly 
proportional to the willingness of U.S. decision-makers to respect alliance norms of 
behavior. Debates erupted within U.S. political and military elites over the need to 
consult the allies89 versus going for unilateral actions. 
After the end of the Cold War, the threat posed by former Warsaw pact countries 
to the North-Atlantic Alliance members significantly decreased. As such, preservation of 
the alliance has been questioned by many. The United States ceased to see Europe as an 
“outpost of its national defense”90 against the Soviet Union. Since the international 
security environment has changed, NATO leaders had to come up with a new military 
doctrine for the post–Cold War security setting. Militaries needed new doctrines and, 
respectively, new missions. A new major threat (or threats) had to be identified, and this 
caused one of the roots of eventual disagreements within the alliance. On one hand, 
everybody agreed that the concept of maintaining large standing armies had lost its 
validity. The Soviet Union was gone and, with it, the need for thousands of tanks and 
artillery systems. New threats required lighter and more mobile armies, capable of 
deploying out-of-area of operations. One the other hand, alliance members were looking 
for “new threats” in different places. Most West European nations perceived the Soviet 
threat as the only one that they feared during the Cold War. Different perceptions of 
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threats, and approaches on how to tackle these threats, led to confrontations within the 
alliance, and claims on behalf of the United States for the right to act unilaterally. 
Throughout the 1990s, unilateralism was the word that was associated with the 
deterioration of the intra-alliance climate. Violations, by the United States, of the 
alliance’s norms became more frequent. Violations of alliance norms were not a new 
phenomenon in the history of the North-Atlantic Organizations.91 There were equal 
temptations in the past, within European governments, to break the alliance norms. 
Whenever it happened, it triggered retaliation from the U.S. side,92 which eventually 
disturbed the balance of the entire community. Robert Jervis characterized this kind of 
behavior by saying that “states change or break the rules as their power and interests 
change.”93 
What lesson can the Moldovan political establishment learn from this NATO 
experience? Pragmatically, Moldova can benefit from the intra-alliance problem. First 
and foremost, the choice of actors to negotiate with, over assistance in the Transnistrian 
problem, can be limited to the United States. Secondly, Washington can go for unilateral 
actions if it sees an interest and deems it necessary to do so. 
2. NATO’s Official Policies and Views Vis-À-Vis Expansion to the East 
The idea to enlarge the North-Atlantic Alliance to Central and Eastern Europe did 
not emerge after the end of the Cold War. The possibility of NATO expansion eastwards 
was considered by President Truman’s administration and the authors of the alliance, 
even before the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949.94 When the North-Atlantic 
Alliance had become a reality, its eventual enlargement was considered only in the 
context of the fight against non-democratic regimes and prevention of the spillover effect 
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U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, commenting on the rationale behind the aid that 
Washington was going to provide to Greece within the framework of the Truman 
Doctrine.95 Acheson said, 
. . . like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of 
Greece would later infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry 
infection to Africa through Asian Minor and Egypt and to Europe through 
Italy and France.96 
Although the Transnistrian regime can not “infect” such large territories as 
described by Secretary Acheson, the dangers it emanates should worry Europeans no less 
than Greece worried the Truman Administration in late 1940s.  
In fact, Ronald Asmus, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, argues in 
his book, “Opening NATO’s Door,” that the decision to expand NATO was a 
culmination of the combined efforts of American interventionists (of Harry Truman and 
Dean Acheson’s formation) and Central and East European pro-Western, anti-Soviet and 
anti-communist dissidents, who wanted Europe united under the auspices of democracy 
and freedom.97 That is to say, long before the Berlin Wall came down, East Europeans 
themselves started, to some extent, building the bridge over the Wall to unite with the 
West. For the White House, it was a crucial moment – to decide in the turmoil ensuing 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union as to whether the United States would take the lead 
in world politics and affirm itself as the only superpower remaining. Going back to 
isolationism was not an option for people in power at that time in Washington. 
After the end of the Cold War, however, NATO enlargement was seen by most 
West Europeans as another increase in defense expenditures. Defense structures of East 
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European nations aspiring to NATO membership had to be brought in accordance with 
alliance standards. Defense transformations were always quite expensive enterprises. 
Most of Central and East European countries could not afford such expenses, therefore 
NATO was supposed to assume the largest portion of the costs. That, in turn, triggered 
the public opinion within old member-states since, for the population in respective 
countries, it meant that additional money was supposed to go for “collective needs.” This 
factor, among others, shaped the attitude of West Europeans towards new NATO 
members and towards the idea of expansion to the East – something else to consider for 
the Moldovan political class. Also, since the United States was covering the lion’s share 
of the NATO budget (and still is, although the EU is trying to shift the burden), 
Europeans couldn’t complain much about expansion. The problem of burden-sharing 
looks quite different when it comes to EU enlargement. Europeans are concerned with the 
ability of future members to take over part of the financial burden. That issue is discussed 
in more detail later in this thesis. In spite of the opposition within both institutions 
towards enlargement to South-Eastern Europe, Moldova’s neighbor, Romania, is already 
a NATO member and presumably will become an EU member in January 2007.  
With Romania’s acceptance into NATO, the Republic of Moldova found itself at 
the frontier of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, sharing 450 kilometers of its Western 
borderline. Thus, the Transnistrian “black hole” is no longer somewhere “far away,” but 
is in very close proximity to the North-Atlantic Alliance and (from January 2007), EU’s 
border. The buffer zone no longer exists. Thus, the Transnistrian regime poses a threat, 
not only to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, but to 
the South-Eastern part of NATO (and, eventually, of the EU). 
From a security standpoint, NATO can be anticipated to more closely scrutinize 
illegal activities in the Transnistrian region from now on. Current Transnistrian 
leadership, as an intelligence target, could be expected to move up on the list of NATO 
intelligence structures. Romania might benefit, in this context, from more resources that 
could be re-directed to Romanian military intelligence services. These resources would 
improve their ability to collect and process information on any suspect activities in the 
vicinity of the NATO area of operation. The West will then have first-hand information 
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on Transnistrian activities (weapons smuggling, human trafficking, money-laundering,98 
etc.), which would be a great help for Moldovan intelligence agencies. So far, they have 
relied only on national assets and resources. As a result, Transnistrian leaders will face 
significant difficulties in covering up the illegal activities that bring them considerable 
income.  
Furthermore, before the conflict is solved, it makes sense for NATO leaders to 
improve security along the border between the territory controlled by the Moldovan 
government, as well as an additional security line in the eastern part of the country 
(Transnistria). The security lines could be also be part of an isolation strategy (or 
containment, to use a less aggressive term), which the Moldovan government might want 
to consider in relation to the separatist regime in Tiraspol. Hence, a more secure border 
with Transnistria would benefit both NATO (it would create a buffer zone) and the 
Republic of Moldova, since it would put constrains on Transnistria. The central 
government has, in the past, applied some economical constraints on Transnistria, but 
these actions triggered immediate retaliation from Moscow. With NATO as an ally, 
Moldova would gain more legitimacy in continuing with such practices. 
Moreover, the weight of Romania, in negotiations, significantly increased after 
the NATO enlargement. Strong political backup allows Romanian leaders and diplomats, 
now more than ever before, to be more vocal on issues such as human rights violations, 
the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria, and illicit support rendered to the non-
democratic regime in Tiraspol. In his “welcome-to-NATO” speech held in Bucharest in 
November 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush hinted at the role the North-Atlantic 
Alliance has attributed to Romania as a regional pilot-nation. Romania, in President 
Bush’s words, would be a “bridge to a new Russia” and would “help the Alliance to 
extend a hand of cooperation across the Black Sea.”99 On the other hand, careful remarks 
about Russia and the projection of NATO strategic objectives “across the Black Sea” 
have disappointed people in Moldova. Several months later, the American President’s 
views on Romania’s role in the region were paraphrased by the NATO Secretary General 
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Lord Robertson, who said that Romania’s “efforts to bring peace and stability in the 
region” should take into consideration the “critical importance of Russia and the 
Ukraine.”100 
Terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September, 2001, sped up the 
alliance’s transformation process. On one hand, that tragedy strengthened the alliance and 
united members-states against a common threat – transnational terrorism. One the other 
hand, different perceptions of the threats have generated disagreements vis-à-vis the 
strategy to be used and the prioritization of targets. Opinions varied within NATO and 
within the European Union, respectively, as to what constituted security issues. The most 
glaring difference was the interpretation of the post-September 11 security environment. 
As a result, NATO’s focus has shifted from Europe to Asia (Afghanistan) and the Middle 
East (Iraq). Alliance assets and resources have been broadly dispersed; NATO has gladly 
handed over part of the security burden in the Balkans to the European Union. Such a 
drastic shift in priorities has further distanced other conflicts in Europe, such as the 
Transnistrian one. 
 
C. WHERE DOES MOLDOVA STAND?  
What help can Moldova possibly expect from NATO? To put it simply, NATO 
can provide what no other organization (UN, OSCE) can provide for the time being and 
in the nearest future – security guarantees. In the long-run, Moldova could have enjoyed 
the full extent of the security guarantee of Article V of the Washington Treaty. NATO, in 
addition, is the only real force that can counterweight the Russian pressure. Taking into 
consideration that fighting communism and authoritarianism was the eternal mission of 
the alliance during the Cold War, Moldova had a reason to believe that NATO would 
push to the end – until the last non-democratic regime in Europe would be dismantled. 
The separatist regime in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova definitely 
falls under this category. From a realist theory prospective, military power is a key 
element and a universal currency in world politics. It can be transferred to other areas 
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(trade, economics, etc.) in order to leverage development. Needless to say that security 
provides an attractive climate for investments desperately needed in countries like 
Moldova. Operationally, NATO is far more sophisticated, flexible and experienced than 
the newly established EUROCORPS. Moreover, NATO is an organization where Russia 
is not a member and, therefore, it can not participate, interfere or influence the alliance’s 
decision-making process. That is important for Moldova, to bring in new international 
organizations and alliances that do not share its institutions with Russia, or at least not to 
a full extent. 
These, in brief, are the benefits that Moldova could have enjoyed if it became a 
full member of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. So far, though, the Republic of 
Moldova has never declared its intention to adhere to the North-Atlantic Alliance due to 
its neutrality status. The neutrality clause has been included in the first Constitution of the 
Republic of Moldova in a specific socio-political environment, and was supposed to 
accommodate the interests of certain political groups inside and outside the country at 
that point in time. 
In the aftermath of the violent confrontations in 1992, the neutrality status was 
supposed to reconcile all political forces largely dispersed across the political spectrum 
(pro-Romanian, pro-independent Moldovan and pro-Russian – supporters of the 
Transnistrian regime). In addition, the neutrality clause was supposed to underline the 
illegitimate presence of Russian troops in Transnistria and force their withdrawal. 
Moldova’s neutrality fit in the West’s strategic interests as well. Had Russia withdrawn 
its troops from Moldova, Moldova’s neutrality would have been a good protective 
measure against Russia expansion to the West.  
It is not surprising that, over the years, Russia sensed the same benefit out of 
Moldova’s status of neutrality as an obstacle in the way of NATO expansion eastwards. 
What used to be purely Moldova’s interest – the status of neutrality – later became 
Russia’s strategic objective in the region. In the context of NATO’s enlargement to the 
East, Russia is interested in continuing Moldova’s neutrality. Therefore, Russia will use 
everything in its might to bar any potential move of the Moldovan government to amend 
the neutrality clause in the Constitution with the intention to apply for NATO 
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membership. So, in the current geo-political settlement, Moldova is seen on both sides as 
a buffer zone. If Chisinau applied for NATO membership now, its chances would be 
quite low. 
In the meantime, when NATO membership is not yet considered in official circles 
in Chisinau, the country can benefit – gaining most of the advantages offered by the 
alliance – through the NATO-led “Partnership for Peace” program. In March 1994,101 the 
Republic of Moldova joined the “Partnership for Peace” program. The initiative did not 
receive a warm welcome within the Moldovan political establishment at that time, which 
saw the program primarily as a tool of U.S./NATO propaganda and preparation of 
grounds for future expansions. In order to disperse the fears of domestic political groups, 
Moldovan President Mircea Snegur declared, at the signing ceremony in Brussels, that 
Moldova was not considering joining NATO102 in the near future. Reluctance towards 
NATO, mixed with confusion over what the program could do for Moldovan Armed 
Forces and for the nation as a whole, turned out to be the biggest impediment at the outset 
of cooperation. Although, at first glance, the program appeared to emphasize mostly 
military aspects of cooperation, in reality it opened the doors for assistance in other 
dimensions as well: economic, social, technological and political. 
First of all, the “Partnership for Peace” program presents a link for Moldovan 
authorities with the most powerful and effective political-military alliance. Having an 
access to such a forum, where leaders of the world’s most advanced democracies get 
together and address different issues, is crucial for Moldova’s leadership. To put it 
another way, the fact of being invited and accepted into the “PfP” program meant a 
recognition of Moldova as a democracy, although weak, but moving in the right 
direction. Now, it had to be understood that, for merely joining the Program, you could 
get a chair – but not necessarily a microphone. To put it simply, in order to have a “say”  
at the forum, to be given the floor and be listened to and maybe understood, the country-
members had to start contributing to the Alliance soon after starting to consume funds 
and resources. 
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Secondly, NATO possesses the most advanced experience in defense 
transformation and military reform areas, and can assist countries like Moldova through 
such a channel as the “PfP” program. Expertise has a great value and it can save 
Moldova’ limited resources from being unwisely wasted (for example, costly 
maintenance of obsolete military hardware inherited from the Soviet army). A Defense 
Assessment, which Moldova conducted in 2002, resulted in a set of recommendations on 
defense budget management and resource allocation for different categories of expenses. 
Thirdly, as mentioned above, within the framework of the “PfP,” a variety of 
country-oriented programs can be developed and implemented. All initiatives and areas 
of bilateral cooperation are united into one consolidated document, the so-called 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). In fact, IPAP is a format designed by Brussels 
in which NATO aspiring countries and PfP members confirm their adherence to Euro-
Atlantic security space and Western democratic values. Although Moldova holds its 
status of neutrality, it has also been granted the IPAP. In a way, it is a provocative 
measure on behalf of the NATO leaders, since Moldova, as all other PfP members, will 
have to clearly and unequivocally formulate its foreign policy objectives. By having 
endorsed IPAP, Moldova has officially confirmed the irreversibility of the pro-European 
course. Along with many other useful initiatives, the security of borders around the 
Transnistrian region discussed earlier can also be addressed within the framework of this 
plan. More resources can be made available through various NATO/PfP Trust Fund 
projects. 
And finally, even though NATO membership is not a goal for Moldova for the 
time being, active participation in the “PfP” program would significantly facilitate the 
nation’s integration into the European Union. In a situation where the EU is looking at 
borrowing much of NATO’s experience and assets in building its defense forces, the 
“PfP” can better prepare Moldova for any kind of pre-admission inspections. 
Unfortunately, for the last decade, Moldovan political elite (as, in fact, politicians 
in a number of other Central and East European countries) did not display an interest in 
exploring the opportunities offered by this program. Several reasons can be outlined here 
that can explain this indifference and apathy. The first is a lack of knowledge (and lack of 
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a will to learn more) in defense matters within the political elite. In the first post-Soviet 
parliamentary elections, held in February 1994, thirteen independent parties and electoral 
blocs competed for seats in the country’s legislature.  
The Agrarian Democrats – the largest political bloc, whose members were drawn 
mostly from Soviet-era collective farms and agro-industrial enterprises leaders103 – had 
won the majority of seats, and assumed the formation of government and other state 
institutions. Needless to say that these people, who eventually formed the bulk of 
independent Moldova’s political elite, had very little knowledge of defense issues and 
only a vague understanding of how the militaries work – how they adopt their decisions, 
where should they be placed within the political landscape, and how they should be 
controlled and held accountable (if they have to be accountable at all.). In the first years 
of independence, the situation was aggravated by the lack of basic laws that were to 
stipulate the formation and operation of main state institutions.  
For the first years of the transition period, old Soviet laws were used in most state 
spheres of activity. Likewise, the same approach was used towards the military. Unlike 
the Baltic republics that decided to build up their military from scratch according to new 
principles and norms, Moldovan politicians chose to create armed forces with 
expropriated portions of the Soviet military, preserving the structural organization, legal 
foundation and regulations. Creation of the National Army was driven mostly by a desire 
to conform to the world’s practices of state-building. For years to come, Moldova’s 
political elite would not bother to properly define the role of the army in their society. 
Armies have always served as unifying pools of the nation.104 Given the heterogeneous 
composition of the Republic of Moldova’s population, the importance of this feature of 
the military increases significantly, especially when the Transnistrian conflict is not yet 
solved and the population remains divided. As the German Kaiser and King of Prussia, 
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Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche (Wilhelm I), proclaimed in 1891: “The soldier and the army, 
not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded the Empire together.”105 The 
armies have traditionally played an educational role in societies, where “even recruits 
from the humblest circumstances became aware of new horizons.”106 In an agricultural 
country like Moldova, the army can still contribute to the emancipation of the youngsters 
coming from the countryside. 
Second, since armies were always a very expensive enterprise in the short-run, 
cooperation in the defense area with NATO countries (even through an intermediate 
program like “Partnership for Peace”) meant increased expenditures for defense. No 
political party wanted to propose to their constituencies an increase in defense budget 
spending when the country was struggling to overcome steadily increasing proportions of 
poverty. Moldovan politicians were not any different in that respect from their 
counterparts in the European Union and NATO member-states who, at the offset of 
alliance formation, were looking “skeptically on suggestions that they should do more 
collective effort, in order to conserve resources for programs vital to their reelection, like 
health, education, and welfare.”107 In a period of turmoil and economic devastation, 
people believe in “quick impact” programs and promises.  
Third, those currently in power in Moldova started their political careers during 
the era of the Soviet Union and thus, were unavoidably affected by the Soviet propaganda 
that touted the European Union as an economic basis for NATO. Therefore, in the early 
1990s, the EU had a negative connotation as well. And last, but not the least, Moldovan 
politicians did not reach a common agreement on whether the nation needed an army or 
not. And if, presumably, the answer was “yes,” then what kind of army and for what 
purpose?  
Now, when cooperation with NATO has intensified, the country’s leadership is 
lacking adequate public support. All this time, since 1994, could have been used to 
educate the population on the necessity and, eventual benefits that the country could get 
out of closer cooperation with the North-Atlantic Alliance within the frameworks of 
                                                 
105 Joll, 71. 
106 Schulze, 140. 
107 Thies, 6. 
47 
“Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program. So far, “PfP” did not stir much interest within the 
Moldovan society. “Social mobility,”108 as Hagen Schulze put it, played a crucial role in 
the integration and consolidation of many European states. Engagement in the political 
and social lives of Moldovan society, or “civic-ness,”109 as Robert Putnam called it, is 
still weak and underdeveloped. This phenomenon is explained by several factors. First 
and foremost, it is due to the economic migration phenomena that has driven about one 
million Moldovans abroad in search of jobs (mostly to Central and Western Europe). 
Second, low living standards do not allow those who remained in the country to 
coordinate their efforts, address and solve problems, and defend their rights through 
indigenous and international civic organizations. Third, Soviet rule has left a deep impact 
on the mentality of the people. As a result, Moldovans lack a civic culture and traditions 
of civil engagement in state affairs. That problem is common for all former communist 
countries. And the final factor is the frustration caused by the politicians’ performance. 
Numerous discouraging factors, due to incoherent behavior displayed by political elites, 
have also added to the indifference and apathy of the society. All these factors put 
together affected the social activity of Moldovans and can explain their lack of interest in 
what is going on in political, economical and social spheres. When it comes to the 
military, politicians and the public are on the same page. Most Moldovans consider the 
army as a useless instrument of the state. 
To some extent, lack of knowledge explains the lack of questions. The “fourth 
estate” of Moldova, the media, remains underdeveloped as well. Opposition TV stations 
and newspapers are few and they limit their diffusion to the suburbs of the capital of the 
country. Those mass-media that reach out to the countryside are obsolete; they lack 
innovative spirit and educationally-, politically- and socially-oriented shows. Few media 
sources (if any) can claim, today in Moldova, to have a diversified financial portfolio. 
Most newspapers and TV stations are sponsored by a single political party or political 
block with a similar platform. That makes the media dependent and excludes objectivity. 
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In the created situation, chances to incite society – to a productive and fruitful debate on 
the necessity for closer cooperation with NATO – seem doomed. 
Actually, pro-NATO and pro-West political groups in Moldova should thank 
Russia for her blatantly brutal policy towards Moldova, which has made Moldovan 
politicians review the priorities in the nation’ foreign policy. Perhaps Moldova needed 
such a slap on her cheek. As a result, the issue of cooperation with the North-Atlantic 
Alliance through the PfP program moved up on the list of the country’s leadership 
priorities. Moldova’s leadership declared that the adopted pro-Western course is 
definitive and is not going to be changed. Such declarations were not made as a bluff, nor 
were they merely expressions of ambitions by individual leaders in response to 
aggressive Russian policies. All recent developments in Moldova point to the country’s 
leadership decision to pursue pro-Western policy. It seems that Moldovan rulers clearly 
understood that benefits from a partnership with NATO would come after some 
investments made by Moldova itself. Under “investments” should be unequivocally 
understood Moldova’s contribution and active participation in NATO and EU-led 
peacekeeping operations. On the political level, it is widely acknowledged now that 
cooperation with NATO is an expensive but worthy enterprise.110 How these decisions 
will be implemented remains to be seen. Some state institutions and structures within the 
legislative and executive branches present a serious impediment in the way of such 
reforms. The gap between official declarations and their practical implementation 
remains quite wide. Cumbersome state bureaucracy widens the gap even more. 
Civilian democratic control over the armed forces and healthy and productive 
civil-military relations are also pre-requisites for NATO membership in the future, but 
before that, it is a facilitating factor for cooperation within the “PfP” program today. 
Democratic and civilian control of the military is an accepted principle among all 
Western democracies, and a precondition for attaining national security goals and 
objectives within a democratic society. A fundamental element of democratic control is a 
uniformed military structure that is subordinated to civilian leaders. In order to ensure 
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civilian control over the armed forces, democratically elected or appointed authorities are 
given the responsibility, in law or legislation, for developing defense policies, overseeing 
their implementation, and promoting transparency and accountability.   
Although, in 2002, the Moldovan Parliament approved the Concept of Military 
Reform, little progress has been registered since then in implementing the provisions of 
this concept. Besides the lack of knowledge discussed in previous paragraphs, there was 
reluctance within certain political groups to have a matrix111 that could have been used 
by society to measure and assess the progress made in the area of national security.112 In 
the absence of a clear foreign policy strategy, politicians would always be tempted to 
shift priorities and goals for their own convenience. For the society, in turn, it appears to 
be difficult to judge whether deputies, to whom they gave their votes, succeeded or 
failed. Since state institutions in charge of national security (Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Interior, Security and Information Service) lack strategic guidelines, it 
appears difficult to judge the validity and reasonability of currently-assigned tasks. 
Now, when the NATO border has moved closer to Moldova, it can also be 
expected that the external pressure exercised by the so-called U.S. regional “combatant 
commanders”113 will increase. Given the absolute lack of coordination between 
Moldovan Armed Forces components and the will to work together, such a “stimulus” 
might be beneficial, in the long run, for Moldova as well. Since its foundation in 1992, 
the National Army conducted little joint training with the Border Guards and Carabineers 
Troops. Relations between three branches of the armed forces are characterized by 
competition and rivalry. At the domestic level, the divide et impera approach facilitates 
the oversight of people in uniforms. In terms of external cooperation with NATO 
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Moldova faces major problems. The problems will persist and might even worsen over 
time if the nation’s leadership doesn’t get directly involved in overcoming the stalemate. 
What are other ways that Moldova can possibly use to bring in NATO? Certainly 
Moldovan diplomats can not follow the experience of their West European colleagues in 
the late 1950s. The story is well known and has been described in John Lamberton 
Harper’s book, “American Vision of Europe.”114 It is basically about how West 
Europeans were trying to solve their internal problems with America’s help. Immediately 
after WW II, the U.S. Administration was considering pulling U.S. troops out of Europe 
and letting Europeans take care of themselves. Most West European governments started 
to pull Americans by the arm, asking them to remain in Europe “for a while” and provide 
a security shield against the Soviet menace. Their ambassadors in Washington tended to 
dramatize the situation at home and, by doing that, were trying to influence and 
manipulate the U.S. political establishment. At that time, Europeans were driven by 
immediate gains from the U.S. presence on the Old continent. However, in the long run 
Europeans failed to foresee the price they would have to pay for this “temporary 
intervention.” Once they decided that they wanted Americans to stay in Europe for a 
longer period of time, they had to assume all the ensuing consequences. 
To put it simply, if Europeans did not want to build their defense forces and take 
over the duty to defend their territories, then America understandably reserved the right 
to impose its rules of the game. That is also something to consider for Moldovan 
politicians who push for Moldova’s integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance. One 
alien rule can be replaced by another. Visible advantages always come in packages with 
invisible disadvantages. Analysis of these advantages and disadvantages is not part of this 
thesis; however, if Moldova concludes that it may benefit in the long-run from NATO’ 
membership, it has to ask for that. One thing to keep in mind for Moldovan politicians is 
that NATO enlargement further to the East came from Central and East European leaders 
themselves.115  
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So, the West Europeans’ approach has little chance for success in the 
contemporary world, although the lobbying tactics are still used by diplomats around the 
world. European members of the North-Atlantic Alliance, even today, tend to manipulate 
the data of their contribution to the alliance by recurring to “selective statistics.”116 
Ironically, those Europeans that tend to shelter themselves from burden-sharing within 
NATO are very pretentious vis-à-vis such countries as Moldova when it comes to 
European integration (which is conditioned by the ability to contribute financially), and 
assistance in reforms and other issues. 
Instead, Moldova can be more successful by showing progress at home, thereby 
creating an attractive environment. Corruption and poverty certainly do not attract 
people. Periodic assessments, especially in defense and security areas, would help to 
better measure this progress. It is also important to take advantage of Western experts in 
defense issues and train indigenous ones (train the trainer), who would be able to “read” 
those matrixes without external help. Many niches of the “PfP” program remain 
untouched so far.  
From the realist theory standpoint, states fight each other because they believe 
that defeating the enemy is in their best self-interest: they get more power and wealth. On 
the other hand, realism can similarly explain why some states cease to fight each other. 
At some point these states may realize that it is in their best interests to stop the violence 
– that they will be better off if they don’t fight each other. By further developing this 
statement, Moldova should try either of the two follow-up options in respect to the 
Transnistrian problem: clearly identify the existence of a “hurting stalemate” in which, 
according to the Zartman definition,117 each side expects things to get worse unless some 
change occurs; or Chisinau should try to identify mutual gains for both regions 
(Bessarabia and Transnistria) in case of integration, and bring them to the negotiations 
table. The center of gravity in negotiations should be shifted from power distribution after 
unification to mutual benefits and gains for the people (prosperity, a better economy, 
better infrastructure, social and health care systems, etc.). 
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D. U.S. VISION OF EUROPE, POLICIES TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE 
AND RUSSIA 
The policies of the North-Atlantic Alliance can not be viewed separately from the 
U.S. vision of Europe as an actor in world power politics. Omitting the details of the 
alliance formation, it should be made clear that it was not without Europe’s tacit approval 
that the United States used NATO as an institution through which Washington 
consolidated its foothold on the Old continent.  
All together – the U.S. political system and the nature of the policymaking 
process; adherence to the principles of a liberal economy and interests of American 
business elite; the culture and ideology of society; and Europe’s vision of America, and 
vice versa – influenced the formulation of the American foreign policy towards the Old 
continent throughout the years.  
Three main strategies towards Europe have guided the American political elite at 
different stages in history: internationalism, isolationism and interventionism. The shift 
from one strategy to another was conditioned at all times by developments around the 
world, perceptions and preferences of different domestic groups, as well as those of 
politicians who were running the country at that very moment. People who work in the 
White House today, or who have a seat in the U.S. Congress, or work in the U.S State or 
Defense Departments are inevitably students of one of these schools of thought.  
Already, at the turn of the twentieth century, America started to challenge the 
supremacy of Europe. Provisions of President James Monroe’ Doctrine of non-
interference in the internal concerns of any of European powers, which guided American 
political class for about a century, were losing their validity. America’s emergence as a 
world superpower brought up the European Question, which, in the words of Alfred 
Mahan, was about deciding “whether Eastern civilization or Western civilization is to 
dominate throughout the earth.”118 This view was embraced, by and large, by many key 
figures within the American political elite at the beginning of twentieth century. 
Although isolationism from Europe continued to be argued with varying temper in 
American political circles in the course of the twentieth century, the interventionist 
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option was enjoying more supporters. Debates and disagreements arose around the 
question: What would be the best way for America to implement this goal?  
It has been acknowledged, though, that supremacy of the United States could be 
achieved only by having a better organization, stronger military and enough boldness to 
suppress the opponents. Fears were expressed that U.S. entanglement in world power 
politics would affect the economical development of the country. Proponents of this 
view, led by President Woodrow Wilson, believed that prosperity could be achieved only 
by avoiding the involvement in “predatory imperialism.”119 And besides all, Wilson’s 
view (as well as Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s, later on) was inspired by the Jeffersonian 
idea of “peaceable coercion.”120 Basically, this meant creating conditions that would 
attract people and supporting domestic groups in other countries that could challenge 
non-democratic regimes. In this case, the U.S. could get involved in country “N” – not 
directly but indirectly – under the banner of different initiatives. The Truman Doctrine 
and, later, the Marshall Plan were two initiatives of a kind launched by the U.S. in Europe 
after World War II. Eventually, societies would supposedly put adequate pressure on 
their governments, making them adopt liberal political and economic systems.  
Hence, Washington has a long tradition of debates between interventionists and 
isolationists. Any expansion of the U.S. presence abroad was not always welcome at 
home. In the 1930s, isolationists within U.S. Congress were fiercely opposing the 
expansion of the U.S. military to the Philippines and Pacific. But even isolationists were 
arguing that a reasonable balance in the world would be “an autonomous Europe, defined 
to encompass most of the territory west of the Soviet Union’s interwar borders, a more 
liberal regime in Russia, and a self-contained United States.121 “Most of the territory” 
obviously didn’t mean “all” and that gave a freedom of actions to American policy-
makers.  
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After the fall of the Soviet Empire, American diplomacy has re-oriented its efforts 
towards restoring good relations with Russia, a country that was always at the center of 
world politics. In the 1990s, an improved partnership with Russia was especially 
important to the U.S., given the slow but steady progress in the process of Europe’s 
unification.  
On the other hand, although the United States was supporting democratization 
processes in Russia since the break-up of the Soviet Union, preventing Russia from 
becoming too strong and being able to dominate the Eurasian continent continues to be in 
the “supreme American interest.”122 Moreover, stable growth of the Russian economy, 
since 2000, strengthens the beliefs of those advocating Russia’s re-emergence as a 
superpower. America cannot afford to underestimate, or even worse, ignore Russia. The 
United States learned a good lesson back in 1941123 before Germany attacked Russia: no 
matter how weak it was (and could be) at the moment, Russia could survive and get up 
from its knees. 
So, Washington would continue to balance between the two main actors on the 
Old continent – the EU and Russia. If the strength of one of the two starts challenging the 
U.S. hegemony, Washington would most likely increase its cooperation with the other.  
To put it simply, the United States will do everything in its might to prevent the re-
emergence of “holy alliances,” “Warsaw pacts,” “quadruple alliances” or any other kinds 
of alliances in Europe and beyond its borders. Although American political leaders 
officially declare the interest of their nation in a united, strong Europe, Washington never 
ceased applying the divide et impera rule. Times have changed, but the tactics remained 
quite the same. Preceding the invasion of Iraq, Washington was extensively promoting 
the idea of New Europe versus Old Europe. In the post–Cold War security environment, 
Old Europe was becoming increasingly disobedient in the eyes of U.S. leaders. 
Washington, in fact, was never willing to tolerate allies that question its decisions and 
oppose its policies on the international scene. The shift to unilateralism was already 
imminent in mid-1990s. Unilateralism is just another interpretation of isolationism and 
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neutrality. A major event was going to be a tipping point and mark the shift from 
multilateralism to unilateralism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided an impetus for the 
U.S. to espouse a different philosophy within the American political establishment. The 
event has granted legitimacy to U.S. policymakers to avoid consensus within the North-
Atlantic Council. On the other hand, certain domestic groups were not going to accept 
America’s sole intervention in the Middle East and Asia. A kind of alliance would 
decrease the anti-American tensions in Europe and other parts of the world. 
It was in connection with new NATO members that the U.S. Administration came 
up with the definition, “coalition of the willing.” Former Warsaw Pact countries, in 
appreciation for the United States’ contribution in tearing down the communists regimes, 
were amongst the first who supported Washington in its calls to form “coalitions of the 
willing” for the military intervention in Iraq. Moldova’s commitment to send troops in 
Iraq as part of the coalition can be considered a significant step on the international scene. 
In a situation when some West European partners refused to support the Iraqi campaign, 
everybody else on board earned, relatively quickly, Washington’s gratitude. Attention of 
the United States towards Moldova has risen noticeably. Again, since the country 
leadership did not involve the media in an informational campaign, the Moldovan society 
could barely understand the benefits that the country might get in the long-run from the 
participation of Moldovan soldiers in a post-conflict stabilization operation in a Middle 
Eastern country. 
In the meantime, Washington sponsored the emergence of a series of regional 
organizations in South-Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea region (Pact for Stability in 
South-Eastern Europe, GUUAM). There are several gains behind this policy. First of all, 
the White House can hand over part of the security burden in some regions (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) and free resources needed in other areas of interest to American 
policymakers (Iraq). Secondly, these organizations can weaken, to some extent, Russia’s 
positions in the region and lessen its influence. That is nothing more than a renewed form 
of internationalist approach in world politics largely advocated by President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s interpretation of an internationalist approach differed 
from President Woodrow Wilson’s views on the problem. Wilson’s understanding of an 
internationalist approach in foreign policy found its expression in the idea to create the 
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League of Nations. Under the League’s umbrella, as Wilson believed, the U.S. could 
form a coalition of world powers that would be able to deter intra-European conflicts. 
The onset of World War II made it clear that the League had failed in its primary purpose 
– to avoid any future world war. Liberal institutionalism in its pure form turned out to be 
a weak tool in achieving a balance of powers on the European continent. Such a large 
organization as League of Nations (and later United Nations) needed a supra-national 
institution that could, ideally, enforce the implementation of the decisions adopted by 
member-states. And besides, there was no room for everybody’s ambitions in this 
organization. It could be expected that the United States, just as other great world power, 
would not accept a higher authority that would constrain it from pursuing its interests 
around the world.  
The idea of regional alliances combined principles of liberal institutionalism and 
realism. The United States can control the national composition of all these regional 
organizations and make sure they don’t challenge U.S. hegemony. In contrast to the 
European multilateral concept of international cooperation, in Washington’ view, an 
“effective” international cooperation must be “backed by American readiness to play our 
[America’s] part.”124 Member-states, in turn, have a chance to improve their relations 
with neighboring countries and contribute to the regional security. Since all these 
regional arrangements ultimately ease the burden for the United States, contribution of 
every single nation matters. As noted earlier, Moldova’s decision to participate in the 
U.S.-led coalition in Iraq gives Chisinau the chance to trade with Washington for a 
stronger support in the Transnistrian issue. Likewise, a more active participation in other 
regional organizations would bring Moldova, although indirectly, closer to the United 
States. It should be kept in mind that, if Moldovans succeed in stirring a real interest 
within the American political establishment in Transnistrian issue, the path from intention 
to implementation is much shorter in the U.S. (and respectively in NATO) than in the 
European Union. 
Support and different kinds of assistance programs for former Soviet republics, 
sponsored by the U.S. Government, form another dimension of an internationalist 
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approach. That is also not a new idea. In the 1940s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
calculation was that, if the U.S. backed the colonies’ struggle for independence, later on 
America would have been able to count on their votes in the League of Nations. In 2003, 
eight out of fifteen former Soviet republics joined the United States in the military 
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IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
MOLDOVA: DOES THE “NEGLECTED RELATIONSHIP”125 HAVE 
A CHANCE FOR REVITALIZATION? 
A. WHAT DOES THE EU OFFICIALLY SAY? 
Following the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the European Union remained one of the two major 
political institutions, alongside NATO, which had to face the consequences of the 
transition to democracy and consolidation of governance in former rival countries. 
Officially, Western Europe opened its door to the newly emerged democracies in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Certainly, it was not in the EU’s interest to build up another Iron 
Curtain farther to the East. That is to say, no more dividing lines had to emerge on the 
continent. That was in everybody’s interest. Forty years of division during the Cold War 
had significantly increased the misbalance between the Western and Eastern halves of 
Europe. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is quoted on this subject as 
saying that “new ’iron curtains’ and cordons sanitaires would merely provide fertile 
ground for nationalist and imperial extremism.”126 The geopolitical changes of the late 
1980s–early 1990s have also significantly altered the security environment on the Old 
continent.  
Although the process of European unification had always been on the agenda of 
Western European leaders since World War II, Europeans’ most successful achievements 
were reached in the 1990s. It was a culmination of a series of initiatives, beginning with 
the declaration on 9 May 1950 of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, to create a 
kind of union of European states to the European Defense Community (in 1952), which 
developed further into European Political Cooperation (in 1970), and finally crystallized 
in the form of Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht treaty of 1992. All 
initiatives had a common purpose: coordination of the West European nations’ position 
on foreign policy issues. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, introduced by the 
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Maastricht Treaty, reflected the desire of Europeans to see Europe more involved in 
foreign affairs, security and defense areas: “greater and coordinated action to deal with 
troubled spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world.”127 The document set 
off the process of framing a common defense. The next treaty, signed in Amsterdam on 2 
October 1997, mentioned the “progressive character” of the process. That is to say, as 
time went by, existing threats were replaced with new ones. Constant changes in the 
geopolitical environment had to be assessed and incorporated into the common EU 
defense policy. Another conclusion, drawn by the Member States from the EU experience 
in dealing with security issues, and thus, reflected in the EU Constitution, was that the 
Union “shall have competence” to fulfill declared intentions. The term “competence” 
presupposes the ability to do something based on skills, experience and adequate funding. 
The Maastricht Treaty called for the mutual solidarity of EU member-states on 
issues of foreign policy and security, and advised nations to refrain from actions that 
contradicted the Union’s interests. The Amsterdam treaty went further, introducing a kind 
of remuneration for solidarity. In response to compliance, each Member State would get 
financial assistance in the case of severe difficulties. However, the mechanism for 
rendering this “assistance” looked quite complicated. It stipulated that a Member State 
would be able to get help only in difficulties “caused by exceptional occurrences….after 
unanimous voting …and under certain conditions,” which sounded more like “never.” 
The December 2000 Nice Treaty was supposed to simplify the procedure.128 The EU 
Constitution introduced the solidarity clause which stipulated conditions and 
arrangements for collective defense. Should a nation be attacked or in crisis, other 
Member States would intervene only following a request from political authorities of the 
country. In rest, commitments to mutual assistance in the defense area would be 
consistent with commitments under the NATO Treaty. 
In December 2003, the European Union adopted its Security Strategy: “A Secure 
Europe in a Better World.” The strategy outlined five key global threats confronting the                                                  
127 Maartje Rutten, “From Nice to Laeken. European Defense: Core Documents,” vol. II, Chaillot 
Paper 51 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2002), 112. 
128 However, an analysis of the Treaty raised criticism that it complicated even more the decision-
making process within the Union. For details see Kristin Archik, The European Union’s Constitution, 
(Washington, D.C.: US Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 27 December, 2005), 
Order Code RS216118. 
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EU – terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states and organized 
crime. The security strategy also called on the EU to promote stability in the European 
neighborhood, which included the EU’s eastern border after enlargement. In this respect, 
the European Security Strategy says that “dysfunctional societies or exploding population 
growth on its (EU) borders all pose problems for Europe.”129 The European Union’s task 
is to “promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union.”130 If 
the EU is serious in implementing this strategy, Moldova may then hope that the 
Transnistrian regime will be among the first priorities on the list. “Well governed 
countries” obviously does not equal “authoritarian regimes.” Whether the European 
Union has adequate capabilities and political will to implement these policies is in 
question. There are at least positive signs of doing that. The proposal to develop a 
common strategy with the Republic of Moldova within the framework of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy is one of them. According to the provisions of this 
strategy, the EU will grant “special neighbor” status to Moldova after the EU’s expansion 
into the region (namely Romania’s acceptance into the community). 
The EU is a young actor in the security building business. It is making its first 
steps and has not yet dispersed its resources on such a large scale as NATO has. Unlike 
the United States, major players within the EU have not displayed an intention to police 
the world.131 Instead, as a European organization, the EU seemed to dedicate much of its 
efforts and resources to the problems on the Old continent. Starting in Maastricht with 
pretty vague declarations “to elaborate and implement decisions that have defense 
implications,” the EU made a significant step in Amsterdam by including the so-called 
“Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management, 
peacemaking). That was an echo of a series of ethnic conflicts that broke out in the 
Balkans in mid-1990s. All lessons learned from these conflicts, as well as from post-
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conflict stabilization operations, were well reflected in the EU’s Constitution. The EU’s 
Constitution added a few more tasks to the previously identified list: “joint disarmament 
operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, post-conflict 
stabilization.”132  
Security of its future Eastern borders should concern the European Union more 
than NATO (where the United States set the tone). Arms and people, illegally smuggled 
from Transnistria, will flood Europe in the first instance. It is much more cost-effective to 
invest in localizing and neutralizing sources of such perils rather than spending 
overwhelming amounts of time and resources trying to fight the problem domestically. 
Beginning in 2007, between Moldova and Germany, for instance, there will be only one 
border – with Romania – instead of the three or four before the enlargement. Every 
national border was playing the role of a filter for illegal immigrants, drugs and arms 
contrabandists. Now there will be only one filter. Even equipped with the most 
sophisticated technologies, one border control will not do the work of three. That raises 
again the argument that neutralizing the source of threat, in this particular case, would be 
much cheaper. As for now, a whole bouquet of the so-called “soft threats” – organized 
crime, arms contraband, illegal immigrants – has fewer obstacles to spillover into EU 
space across the Moldovan-Romanian border.133  
On 22 February 2005, the Republic of Moldova and the European Union signed 
the so-called Action Plan setting out the road map for Moldova’s institutions to adjust 
existing practices and norms to meet European standards. Implementation of the plan’s 
provisions is supposed to bring Moldova closer to the eventual integration into European 
structures. With respect to the Transnistrian conflict, the EU-Moldova Action Plan 
includes a set of obligations assumed by the EU: “to step up its involvement in 
supporting OSCE and mediators in this process…continue its efforts to ensure the 
fulfillment by Russia of the Istanbul commitments with regard to Moldova…reinforce  
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political dialogue between the EU and Moldova on the Transnistrian conflict…significant 
[emphasized] further progress with the Ukraine on pending border questions along the 
Transnistrian border section.”134  
To conclude, things look promising in the official EU policies and statements. 
Adepts of liberalism theory would argue that cooperation between nations within the 
European Union would most likely be sustained, since relations are based not on the 
power structure of the international system, but on the democratic domestic orders of 
these states. As such, since the Republic of Moldova is moving towards democracy and a 
market economy, it has many chances to be integrated into the peaceful order of liberal 
democracies.135 One can not deny that, culturally, Moldova is more European than 
Turkey, for example, another country that aspires to EU membership and which has 
better chances of being accepted into the European community in the near future than 
does Moldova. The question arises as to whether the EU has really become a viable 
alliance. A look inside the European Union portrays the community from a bit different 
prospective; the next section addresses the other side. 
 
B. WHAT REALLY HAPPENS WITHIN THE EU?  
In the meantime, member-states of the European Union are still struggling over 
developing a common European identity. Egotism persisting in many European nations 
seriously affects the progress of the negotiations process. Since the European Union is 
still undergoing the process of consolidation, even today the CFSP does not speak clearly 
with one “European voice.” In this direction, the European Union succeeded far less than 
in promoting a single market and introducing a single currency. New provisions included 
in the EU Constitution that were supposed to fix the problem – such as new president and 
foreign minister positions – will not be in force until the Constitution is ratified by all 
twenty five members.  
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With respect to the aspiring to EU membership nations, the process of developing 
a comprehensive integration strategy is even slower. It has sounded more like a mixture 
of different views and policies of West Europeans towards Newly Independent States 
(NIS) that emerged in Eastern Europe. Throughout the 1990s, the European Union was 
more concerned with its internal problems, namely internal reforms and preparations for 
the upcoming enlargement. In the meantime, a series of inter-ethnic clashes broke out in 
the Balkans, drawing the attention and, eventually, the resources (diplomatic, political, 
financial, etc.) of the European community. All these problems have shifted the focus of 
the European Union away from South-Eastern Europe, including the Republic of 
Moldova. These are just a few factors that could explain why the EU’s policies towards 
the Republic of Moldova did not progress much beyond the declarations. 
Nationalism is still felt quite strongly in Europe. As Hagen Schulze put it, “there 
can be no doubt that the poison of mass nationalism, to which Europe almost succumbed 
once before, has lost none of its virulence.”136 Susan Strange has argued in this context 
that, “Europeans are more serious in the attention they pay to historical evidence and 
more sensitive to the possibilities of divergent interpretations of ‘facts’.”137 Whatever 
role memories have played, fact remains that with the rejection by French and Dutch 
voters of the Union’s Constitution in separate referenda in May and June 2005, 
respectively, the EU has come to a serious internal crisis. At the time of this writing, only 
twelve out of twenty five EU members have ratified the Constitution. 
Moldova had to learn the complex interplay of national and common interests, 
and often conflictual relations between national and EU authorities. In such a situation it 
appears to be more efficient to lobby the issue of European integration on a bilateral basis 
rather than trying to push them through official Brussels.  It can be argued, though, that it 
is normal that, at the country level, Europeans are concerned with their internal problems 
more and place them higher than the Union’s problems. Disparity in income and 
economic opportunities between different member-states within the EU has quite often 
led to a stalemate in negotiations. As such, all these internal quarrels have had an impact 
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on the EU’s activities on an international scale. The entry of ten new member countries in 
May 2004, whose citizens’ incomes were well below the EU average, has widened these 
gaps even more. 
National interests of member states inevitably influence the formulation of the 
EU’s policies. Moldova has discovered that, along with other former Soviet republics,  
the European Union is a quite complicated bureaucratic partner. Different policy areas 
have different decision-making procedures. Issues on economics, trade and social 
policies, for example, are currently decided by a complicated system of majority voting 
(Qualified Majority Voting – QMV138) while decisions relating to foreign, security and 
defense issues still require consensus. Critics have long charged that the EU’s decision-
making processes “are too slow and cumbersome, and that the EU’s institutions are 
overly complex, lack transparency, and are unintelligible to the average European 
citizen.”139 And besides, how many of those “average European citizens” will agree (and 
will have the ability and enough intelligence) to study a 240-page Constitution drafted 
within the EU structures. In this context, further enlargement of the Union will only make 
the decision-making process more complicated. 
Officially, the EU dignitaries say that any country that meets the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria140 is eligible to become a full EU member. In reality, however, 
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unlimited EU enlargement is not unanimously welcomed.141 And here, perhaps, 
something else is at play, something more than mere indexes of the Copenhagen criteria. 
Whereas it can be anticipated that any nation aspiring to EU membership can mobilize its 
internal resources and “pass the Copenhagen criteria test,” the EU is concerned with 
“political, economic and societal culture”142 that new members will bring to the 
community. These cultures are believed to be deeply affected by communist ideology and 
would only damage the existing EU institutions. 
The European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP), as a component part of 
CFSP, is also still underdeveloped, which was confirmed by the negative reaction of the 
EU member-states toward Javier Solana’s Report143 regarding the more active 
involvement of the EU in the settlement of the “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet 
countries. In the early 1990s, the European Union tried unsuccessfully to broker a 
political solution to the crisis in Yugoslavia. After the genocide in Bosnian Srebrenica in 
1995, the EU seems to have come to understand that besides diplomatic means it must 
develop a robust mechanism of military intervention, i.e., “diplomacy must be 
coordinated among the main European partners and be based on a credible ability to use 
force.”144  
The coherence of the European response to other security threats, such as 
terrorism, deserves a harsh criticism as well. Neither the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center in the USA, nor the Madrid explosions in 2003, have incited an adequate concern 
among Europeans. Only since the London bombings on 7 July 2005 have the Europeans 
started taking some measures towards improving security of the population. However, 
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neither has the London tragedy made Europeans more united under the security banner. 
Moreover, France declared after the bombings in London that it deemed necessary to re-
instate border control for people traveling from other Schengen states. In a situation 
where the EU is dealing astonishingly slowly with more imminent threats, one might 
have a feeling that it would take forever to draw the West’s attention to and involvement 
in the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. 
 
C. REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ON THE EU AGENDA: WILL OFFICIAL 
DECLARATIONS BE EVER CONVERTED TO REAL DEEDS? 
Although the Republic of Moldova has never declared its intention to adhere to 
NATO due to its neutrality status, it has expressed its will to join the European Union. 
The European Union has attracted former communist countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe with more advanced and stable political and economic systems. Some nations 
expressed their desire to join the European community sooner than others. Although all 
these countries had lived for several decades under a similar political system – 
communism – its collapse produced different social and political contexts.145 Some 
societies have managed to break, definitely and irreversibly, with the past; some are still 
suffering from nostalgia for the “good old days.” Indeed, Moldova marked itself by its 
inconsistency in developing a comprehensive policy for external cooperation.  
For Moldova, being accepted into the European Union is not just a matter of 
being officially recognized as a European country. It is also a desire to align itself with 
the advanced Western civilization, which resides on higher values and superior norms. 
However, it should be mentioned here that these aspirations have been formulated, more 
or less clearly, only in the last few years. It is doubtful that Moldovan society manages to 
follow such quick and drastic shifts in foreign policy from a strong pro-Russian 
orientation in 2001, to an equally strong pro-European orientation in 2003. Moldovans 
remain, for the time being, the only people in the world that brought communists to 
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power through free and fair elections. With such a reputation, the pro-European 
aspirations of Moldova would most likely be questioned by many in the West.  
On 28 November 1994, the Republic of Moldova and the European Union signed 
the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (in force since July 1998 for an initial period of 
ten years), which aimed at replacing old arrangements of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union. In terms of practical implementation the country’s leadership didn’t progress 
much beyond the provisions and opportunities offered by this agreement.146 It is also true 
that Moldova’s joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) contributed to the 
EU’s modest and careful involvement in the country’s democratization process. This kind 
of behavior on the international scene reflected the calculations of Moldova’s domestic 
interest groups and the business elite, which maintained strong ties with Russian 
counterparts. Inconsistency in formulating the nation’ goals and priorities in foreign 
affairs have generated a negative response, even in the hearts and minds of those willing 
to help Moldova. Therefore, it should not have been surprising that the EU’s technical 
assistance to Moldova (through TACIS program and other projects) was indirectly 
proportional to its cooperation with CIS countries. And besides, from an economic 
rehabilitation point of view, the Commonwealth of Independent States could not be a 
suitable format for Moldova since CIS countries were imposing tariffs on each other’s 
goods in contravention to world practices of economic integration treaties. 
It was not until 2003 that the country’s leadership officially applied for EU 
membership and undertook some important measures in this direction. In respect to 
Transnistria, the issue had been addressed on every occasion in the meetings with EU 
officials, at different levels, well before Moldova has firmly settled on the European 
vector. After all these meetings and visits, both in Chisinau and Brussels, Moldovans had 
reason over the last decade to expect more critical voices from the EU regarding the 
human rights violations, armaments smuggling and human trafficking that were taking 
place in Transnistria. In this regard, the European Union proved to have limited 
capabilities and political will. The EU is mostly an economic entity that has not been 
able, so far, to convert its wealth into a strong political leverage. It could establish 
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regulations for the markets’ operation, develop and impose a monetary policy, and 
impose tariffs. But, it has not been able to provide security on its own. Investments do not 
flow into unsafe and unstable areas, and trade obviously follows the investment flow. 
With what eyes is the EU looking to further expansion to the East? Those who 
promote the idea of limiting the EU’s expansion eastwards rely on the regime theory 
provisions, which stipulate that if the “N”-number of states participating in a regime is 
lower – cooperation is easier. In this respect, given the strength of nationalists’ feelings in 
Europe, it could be expected that Moldova would be sacrificed as a candidate in favor of 
the national interests of some West European states.  
The next obstacle on the path to European integration derives from the preference 
of older democracies to see, amongst their colleagues, only strong governments that are 
capable of collecting revenues from their constituencies and contributing to the 
community budget. That issue has become extremely sensitive and important for 
Europeans, especially in a situation when the EU wants to prove (mainly to the United 
States) its ability to recruit, and maintain a strong and modern military force. In this 
context, the principle of conditionality used by the EU towards countries aspiring to EU 
membership can work against Moldova. In brief, this principle gives EU authorities quite 
a strong leverage over the countries that have lined up to join the community in the 
nearest future.  
Furthermore, there is a concern within original fifteen EU member-states that 
newcomers would lower the overall living standards in the EU. Concerns are raised in 
regard to an increasing number of immigrants (legal and illegal ones), which basically 
means an influx of cheap labor into EU member-states. Moreover, the cultural gradient 
might disappear in the near future with the increasing heterogeneity of Europe’s 
population. The burst of revolts within Muslim communities in 2005 in Western Europe 
(France, Germany and the Netherlands) has also strengthened the anti-EU-expansion 
feelings among Europeans. 
That explains the fierceness with which the EU is forcing aspiring nations to 
improve their economies and raise the living standards for their populaces. It is worth 
mentioning here that West Europeans did not propose to their eastern neighbors anything 
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like Marshall Plan – a U.S.-sponsored initiative that helped them, West Europeans, re-
build their economies after WW II. One can not deny that it was thanks to substantial 
financial assistance that today’s EU members have reached the high standards in their 
economies and living conditions for their populations. Eastern European nations were 
struggling to overcome the legacies of authoritarianism without (or with very limited) 
external support. 
Moreover, the EU can, at any time, modify all standards and requirements in 
respect to an individual country and, conversely, increase them in regard to others. Add 
to that, the fact that interpretation of achievements can differ from one standard to 
another. For example, Moldova, as all other candidate countries, would be accepted into 
the EU only after having solved its internal problems. The Transnistrian dispute is the 
main one. But, in order to find a political solution for the Transnistrian problem, Moldova 
needs the EU’s direct and active involvement in the negotiation process with Russia. That 
is a vicious cycle. That said, Moldova has equal chances of getting, instead of 
membership, the “special status” of the Union’s New Neighbor after Romania joins the 
EU in 2007. Hopefully, the EU will pay closer attention now to how its “new neighbor” 
is doing. Perhaps, the EU will also watch closely what is going on along Moldova’s 
border with another “new neighbor,” the Ukraine. Illicit trade across this border has 
sustained the Transnistrian regime all these years. 
Moldovan politicians should be prepared to be disappointed if the EU fails to live 
up to Moldova’s expectations. The intensity of the EU’s involvement depends on the 
stakes involved. For Moldova, the stake is clear – EU membership. For the EU, in turn, 
Moldova is not an attractive member. In a situation when the interests of one side in a 
dialogue is lacking, it appears difficult to formulate any “common strategies,” “mutual 
interests,” “common spaces, areas, or spheres of cooperation.” All these definitions entail 
the equal participation of two parties.  
The EU did not have, throughout the 1990s, a clear strategy147 as to how to build 
its relations with former Soviet republics. This was mainly because, in most West 
                                                 
147 One idea extensively expressed in most West European countries in early 1990s was that former 
Soviet states should stay together and form up another cohesive community that was to replace Soviet 
Union. The emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States has been seen as prove to this 
assessment. 
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European states, such a strategy was absent. There must be an explanation to that 
phenomenon. Some sources suggest148 that Western Europe took a cautious position vis-
à-vis the East and, to some extent, believed in the recidivism of Soviet Union-like 
alliances in the East. The next section discusses the visions of Eastern Europe held by the  
key players of the European Union (namely Germany and France) that could explain, to 
some extent, the ambiguous EU policy towards the Republic of Moldova for the past 
decade.  
A sign of the EU’s more active engagement in Transnistria is the decision of the 
European Council on 16 March 2005, to assign Mr. Adrian Jacobovits as the European 
Union Special Representative for Moldova. Thus, Moldova became the second country, 
after Macedonia, in which a EU special envoy has been assigned only for a single 
country, not for a whole region.149 It should be mentioned here that the EU assigns a 
Special Representative whenever it wants to give a particular case a diplomatic strike and 
visibility on the international scene. Two out of four main tasks stipulated in the mandate 
are directed to the “conflict settlement” and “preparations for EU participation in 
implementation of the conflict settlement.”150 In addition, at the end of 2005, the EU 
launched a Border Assistance Mission with a two-year mandate, which is empowered by 
the EU to monitor the Transnistrian segment of the border with the Ukraine. The Mission 
intends to identify a solution to the frozen Transnistrian conflict as part of the European 
Neighborhood Policy.  
Whether all these steps are “window-dressing” moves on behalf of the European 
Union, or the beginning of a long-term engagement, remains to be seen. So far, the EU 
has proceeded carefully (perhaps too carefully) in respect to the Transnistrian dispute. 
 
 
                                                 
148 See Lieven and Trenin, Ambivalent Neighbors, 7-8 
149 EU Special Representative for Bosnia, Lord Ashdown is also the UN High Representative, and he 
exercises most of his extensive prerogatives by virtue of his UN mandate. Ambassador Heikki Talvitie is 
assigned as EUSR for the whole region of South Caucasus.  
150 A full description of the EUSR’s mandate for Moldova can be viewed at: 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/84175.pdf (last accessed in January 2006).  
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D. VISIONS OF MAJOR PLAYERS WITHIN THE EU VIS-À-VIS EASTERN 
EUROPE 
"Your map of Africa is really quite nice. But my map of Africa lies in Europe. 
Here is Russia, and here... is France, and we're in the middle – that's my map of 
Africa."151 (Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismark) 
The citation reflects the debate that was alive in Germany before World War I 
when major European powers were competing with each other for new territories and 
more wealth. The main subject was where “the backyard” of Germany should be: in 
Africa, Asia or in Eastern Europe. The majority of Germans leaned towards Eastern 
Europe. 
That vision, of Germans towards South-Eastern Europe, was still valid almost a 
century later. In 1999, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was quoted as saying 
that “obviously south-east Europe is part of Europe and it is our responsibility. This is 
true.”152 Although that phrase was said in the context of the burden sharing between 
allies (mostly between Europeans and the United States) during the NATO campaign in 
the former Yugoslavia, it indicates to some extent the importance Germany attributes to 
South-Eastern Europe in its foreign policy.  
So, where are Germany’s stakes in the East? Russia can certainly be named as 
Germany’s major partner in the East. One of the most recent pieces of evidence that 
unequivocally points to the existence and rise of mutual German-Russian interests was a 
new strategic joined project, launched by both nations in December 2005. The project 
aims at building the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) that is to carry Russian natural 
gas to Germany under the Baltic Sea, bypassing the Ukraine and Poland. Such a move 
from both states can be interpreted in many ways. However, it certainly indicates the big 
interests that both nations have at stake in their relations. An interesting detail of this 
story is that former German Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder has been appointed as head 
of the NEGP shareholders oversight committee. From a historical standpoint, that is not 
an unusual thing. Although two world wars in the 20th century have cooled down 
                                                 
151 Quoted from a conversation of Bismarck with a colonial enthusiast 1888. Last accessed in 
February 2006 at: http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck 
152 Thomas Lippman, Yugoslavs Begin Kosovo Retreat (Washington Post, June 11, 1999), p.A22; 
quoted in Thies, Friendly Rivals, 164. 
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relations between these two nations, there was a common practice in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries that German bureaucrats and military officers used to be invited to 
the Russian court153 and offered high level postures by the Russian czar. Unusual is the 
fact that this old practice has been re-animated in the 21st century. Is it a case of history 
repeating itself? Again, talking about the role of individuals in international relations, 
amicable relations of Russian President Vladimir Putin with German Chancellor Gerhardt 
Schroeder could be another good example. Because of Schroeder, Germany was (during 
his entire term in office, until the 2005 elections at least) one of Russia’s strongest 
supporters in Europe. A significant moment in the relations of both nations was the 
participation of Chancellor Schroeder in the 60th anniversary celebrations of the end of 
World War II in Moscow – a historical event that marked the reconciliation of a re-united 
Germany and Russia. 
Germany is by far Russia’s biggest trading partner in Europe. In 2004 Germany 
accounted for 14% of Russia’s exports comparing with other European states. About the 
same figure reflects Russia’s imports of goods from Europe as a whole.154 Amazingly, 
the NEGP was initially negotiated as a joint EU-Russia project.155 Whether it was a 
deliberate choice of the Russian political elite or not, the fact is that Russia has cut a deal 
with Germany only on a bilateral basis instead of with the EU as a partner. It could be 
supposed that making a strong ally within the European community was more important 
for Russia. Divide et impera remains a valid and quite powerful strategy. 
As early as in 1975, British politicians proposed in the so-called “Sonnenfeldt 
Doctrine” a new plan for a division of Europe (Christianized soon after as “Yalta II”) 
which aimed at accommodating Russia’s interests in Eastern Europe. At that point in 
time, British leaders declared that the “Finlandization”156 of Soviet republics would be an 
acceptable solution for them. Interestingly enough, the idea was not supported by 
Britain’s closest ally – the United States. The U.S. State Department objected to the plan, 
worrying about the “complicity of the United States in consigning East European states to                                                  
153 Since Russians retain 51% of project’ shares it could be said that German Chancellor has been 
offered a job by Russians. 
154 Pekka, 12.  
155 Ibid., 16. 
156 Harper, 335. 
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the Soviet sphere of influence.”157 In fact, perceptions in the West differed and changed 
over time as to where Europe started and where it ended. At some point in history, even 
Czechoslovakia was, for highly-placed politicians like former British Prime-Minister 
Neville Chamberlain, a “far away country.” Times have changed and people’s 
perceptions of the world have changed as well. However, visions of a nation’s first 
people inevitably have an impact on the next generation and the vision of the society as a 
whole. 
Britain, another major European Union member-state, does not fear less the 
rehabilitation of Russia as a key player on the European stage. Russia herself has 
recognized that Russophobic feelings persisted in most East European countries.158 
Perhaps on these grounds, the United Kingdom has extended its cooperation with 
Moldova in the last years.159 Or it is just a part of “classic British policy of a balance of 
power in Europe in which, through a system of pacts, it would pacify an unruly continent 
on England’s threshold.”160  
France’s relations with NATO, its influence within the European Union and 
attitudes towards Eastern Europe are shaped to a large extent by the belief among the 
French political class in France’s “unique international role and aspirations to world 
power status.”161 With this in mind, with respect to the enlargements of NATO162 and the 
EU to Eastern Europe, France remains the most vocal opponent in both cases. One should 
not forget that unification of Germany in 1989 was received with reluctance by the 
French political establishment and perceived as a threat to its relative power in European 
politics.  
                                                 
157 Harper, 335. 
158 Pekka, 30.  
159 In 2005 UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned its permanent representative in Moldova for a 
three-year term that is going to provide expertise on EU-Moldova Action Plan implementation.  
160 Schulze, 314. 
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Ambivalence (Chippenham, Wiltshire: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2000), 69. 
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Among France’s arguments against NATO expansion, fear to “provoke a negative 
reaction in Moscow”163 lists as one of the main reasons, along with concerns about 
increasing American influence within the alliance. It can be argued, though, that these 
two arguments have equal weight for French politicians. The French equally want to 
maintain good relations with Russia and to decrease U.S. influence within the North-
Atlantic Alliance – and in Europe as a whole. Every new NATO member is perceived in 
Paris as an additional ally of the U.S. in Europe. Therefore, potential NATO candidate 
countries would not enjoy much support from France in the adherence process. 
With the enlargement of the European Union, French opposition is even stronger. 
France traditionally played a key role within European affairs. A further enlargement of 
the Union is believed to “erode French influence in the EU.” That fear was at the core of 
France’s rejection of the EU Constitution in May 2005.164 
When it comes to relations with Russia, France, just like Germany, has developed 
separate cooperation initiatives, which were supposed to fall along the lines of common 
EU policies towards Russia. France follows Germany in the list of European countries 
most dependent on Russian oil (24% of its internal consumption). Some French oil 
companies have a share in the Russian oil industry.165  
In sum, the lack of cohesiveness amongst West European countries in their 
strategy towards South-Eastern Europe can be explained by the lack of a real interest. 
The West understandably fears that, by accepting traditionally poor countries (like 
Moldova, which has been labeled as the poorest country in Europe ever since 
independence) in the Union, they would have to carry much of the burden. The idea is 
deeply seeded in the minds of West Europeans that the anthropology of East Europeans is 
not predisposed to a Western civilization, democracy and everything that comes along 
with it.  
On a general scale, it appears that some West European nations (France, 
Germany) have gladly handed over their anti-Russian mood to their new colleagues from 
                                                 
163 From the speech of the Delegate for European Affairs, Alain Lamassoure on “L’Heure du vérité”; 
quoted in Menon, 45. 
164 Archik, 3. 
165 Pekka, 18. 
76 
Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps somebody must play this role and keep Russia under 
tension. In the meantime West Europeans can repair their bilateral relations with Russia 
and extend their contacts in the business area.166 The question that emerges here is: to 
what extent can the former Soviet republics and East European countries develop their 
policies based on this kind of phobia? Can they indefinitely rely on NATO/EU support in 
solving disputes with Russia? Can Moldova afford to pursue the same approach? It 
remains clear, however, that bitter historical experience will inevitably dominate the 
Moldovans’ attitude towards Russia. But, on the other hand, it is very unlikely that any of 
the major powers would enter into open confrontation with Russia over Moldova. 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
If the Republic of Moldova decides to continue in an equal manner its cooperation 
with both NATO and the EU, it might get frustrated at some point by the duplication of 
efforts and commitments it has to make. The same institutions (MOD, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, etc.) will have to deal with two slightly different approaches to defense 
and security issues and two separate commitments with forces and resources. Of course 
imitation is much easier than invention. Moldova can follow the tendency spreading 
amongst other European countries – trying to put two different hats (NATO’s and EU’s) 
on the same soldier. That could be what Wallace J. Thies called a “two-for-one-deal.”167 
However, given recent developments within the EU, Moldova is not going to have to face 
the problem of duplication of efforts in the near future. So far, NATO is still up and 
running. Its capabilities remain “superior to those of the Europeans alone, and will 
remain so even if and when the Europeans develop their own capabilities.”168 By stating 
that, James Sperling and Emil Kirchner relied on their empirical data, which pointed to  
 
 
                                                 
166 Several Western oil production companies have invested so far in the Russian oil industry. Besides 
Germany, French Total company holds 25% of Russian Novatek gas company; British Petroleum has 
united part of its capital with Tyumeni Petrol Company TNK; Shell has acquired 55% of another Russian 
company on the Sakhalin peninsula. See for more Pekka, EU, Russia, and Common Economic Space,. 
167 Thies, 191. 
168 Bauwens et al., The CSCE and the changing Role of NATO and the European Union, 21; quoted 
in Sperling and Kirchner, Recasting The European Order, 77. 
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the lack of indication that “European countries are prepared to spend the extra 2-3 percent 
of GDP annually needed to achieve a minimum level of autonomy from NATO and the 
United States.”169  
Moldova has committed itself to the “Partnership for Peace” program. 
Unfortunately, “commitment” was understood differently by some politicians in 
Moldova. Commitment means implementation of the assumed obligations. Waving 
implementation of “PfP” objectives from one year to the next did not earn Moldova a 
good reputation.  
It is true that there is much room for improvements even within the limits of 
existing partnership programs and agreements with both NATO and the EU (“Partnership 
for Peace” program with NATO and Action Plan with EU). Every program, initiative is 
virtually an additional “pipeline,” channel of cooperation through which Moldova can get 
assistance in the period of transition to democracy and consolidation. From its side, 
Moldova must ensure that the “taps” from these “pipelines” are kept permanently open. 
That is to say, it should make sure that there are workable mechanisms put in place that 
will contribute to the wise management of allocated resources. 
Although Moldova should not slow down its efforts in negotiations with 
Transnistrian leadership, it should try not to overstress the severity of the problem. 
Instead, it should increase its efforts in other areas of state-building as well. It must focus 
on improving living standards, creating a more attractive (for people living in 
Transnistrian region) investment climate. The Moldovan legislators have come up with 
initiatives of a kind (such as a preferential fiscal policy for Transnistria-based 
businesspeople). Unfortunately, these positive moves have been hampered by the clumsy 
bureaucracy. 
The last actor, whose role in the fate of Moldova remains quite important, is 
Russia. All arguments – pro-intervention and against – discussed in this chapter will lack 
objectivity and viability if not considered through the prism of NATO-Russia and EU-
Russia relations. Some experts in the West believe that major EU members’ (Germany 
and France) heavy reliance on Russian oil is one of the main reasons these nations tend to 
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avoid public criticism of “Russia’s domestic and foreign behavior.”170  The U.S. would 
also like to have Russia as a partner on more important issues. The next chapter presents 
a short survey of interests involved in relations of the three major actors in contemporary 
world politics. 
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V. NATO/EU – RUSSIA BARGAIN OVER MOLDOVA  
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In 2004, an International Crisis Group (ICG) report on Transnistria contended 
that, despite Russia’s comforting rhetoric regarding cooperation with the EU and the 
United States in conflict resolution and peacekeeping, “old habits appear to die hard. 
Russia remains reluctant to see the EU, U.S. or the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe playing an active role in resolving the Transnistrian conflict 
because Moldova is still viewed by many in Moscow as a sphere of exclusively Russian 
geopolitical interest.”171  
Can Russia be forced to abandon its imperialistic ambitions? For Moldova, there 
is no other choice than to rely on liberal institutionalism theory of international relations. 
Whereas realism is a theory about Great Powers, small nations can survive only by 
integrating in international organizations and alliances. Large international organizations, 
of which Russia may or may not be a member, can constrain its aggressive behavior 
towards smaller and weaker members. Yet, even liberal institutionalism provides some 
niches for big nations. Supporters of the “rationalist” school of liberal institutionalism 
argue that “international institutions and norms are expected to merely influence the cost-
benefit calculations of actors in international relations and constrain their behavior” and 
not to make states abandon their interests at all.172 These concepts apply to organizations 
like the United Nations and OSCE and, to some extent, to the EU as well.  
At the outset of the twentieth century, U.S. policy-makers came up with their 
solution on how to deal with Russia. Debates within the American political elite have 
generated a new policy in the area of power politics – the policy of protocontainment. In 
brief, the essence of the policy was not to engage openly a given country (in this case 
Russia) but rather to keep its power within limits so that it did not become too powerful 
and, respectively, influential in world politics. The policy could be implemented by 
threatening Russia’s interests simultaneously in different parts of the world and, by doing 
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that, forcing Russia to disperse her resources on a large front. Who is able and willing to 
use this tactic against Russia today? Theoretically, the United States can use the North-
Atlantic Alliance as a tool to pursue such a policy. In reality, the interests of the 
American political elite may not support this course of actions. 
Realists would say that in a triangle made of NATO, EU and Russia – any two 
players, theoretically – would most likely seek to make an alliance in order to weaken the 
position of the third party.173 Every party would be concerned about its relative power in 
respect to others. In this context, NATO and the EU enlargement could increase the 
asymmetry in negotiations with Russia over its former and current zones of influence, in 
case the two alliances agree to combine their efforts. That possibility was successfully 
tested during the 2004 presidential elections in the Ukraine, when NATO and the EU 
launched in unison a harsh criticism towards Russia for its brutal interference in the 
electoral campaign of an independent state.174 
With respect to the cooperation between NATO and the EU on the Transnistrian 
issue versus Russia, the realist theory of international relations, again, would say that 
there must be a clear pay off – a visible benefit – for a country or alliance to make a 
coalition with another state (or in this particular case, an alliance) against the third player 
(Russia). This is not just for the sake of principle. In reality, there is little at stake for 
either NATO or the EU in Moldova (let alone the Transnistrian conflict) that could 
outbalance the interests both alliances have at stake in their relations with Russia. To 
paraphrase this argument from a neo-realist theory prospective, a state (or a political 
actor) will “attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the 
expected costs.”175 
                                                 
173 An anti-American German-Franco-Russian alliance has already emerged over the war in Iraq. 
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So far, NATO and the EU seem to have accepted the existing state of affairs 
around the Transnistrian dispute. Russia has provided a set of arrangements – territorial, 
political and economic – that satisfied all parties. However, since every system in 
international relations is subject to adjustments due to constant political, economic and 
technological developments, the balance of power in Russia’s arrangements vis-à-vis 
Transnistria might change as well. Thus, this chapter discusses the rationale of NATO 
making a coalition with the EU against Russia in negotiations over the Transnistrian 
conflict. 
The intra-alliance developments (within NATO and the EU), as well as the 
policies of major powers towards Moldova, were discussed in previous chapters. Now, 
this chapter discusses the political and economic interests existing in relations of both 
alliances (NATO and the EU) with Russia, and what could be the incentives to use 
potential asymmetries in negotiations over the Transnistrian region. 
 
B. NATO – RUSSIA RELATIONS 
1. NATO Policy Towards Russia 
Russia is not as central to NATO’s interests as was the U.S.S.R. The importance 
of the Soviet Union was due to the menace it projected towards the West during the Cold 
War. Differences in political systems rendered impossible any tentative cooperation 
between the two superpowers. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, much of the 
former Soviet threat has disappeared. The old ideology is gone. Russia, however, having 
inherited the Soviet nuclear assets, remains a nuclear superpower. Therefore, it will 
continue to play a major role in determining the security environment on the Old 
continent and beyond. With this in mind, NATO was seeking in the post–Cold War 
setting to provide Russia a “respected place in a European security arrangement.”176 That 
was definitely not an easy task. Russia’s economic and military powers have significantly 
decreased, but ambitions have remained the same. Whatever “arrangements” NATO was 
going to propose, Russia would have never accepted a secondary positions in any deal.  
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On the other hand, the future NATO policy towards Russia pretty much depends 
on internal developments in this country. In a situation when a reverse to authoritarianism 
in Russia was not excluded, it made sense for NATO to extend its security guarantees to 
Central and Eastern Europe.177 In the late 1990s, President Clinton’s administration 
managed to overcome Russia’s resistance to extend NATO into Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Ronald Asmus believes that President Clinton’s merit was to get 
through the decision for alliance expansion by avoiding, in the meantime, a crisis in 
relations with Russia. Indeed, it was a masterful use of Russia’s weakness at that time. 
Yeltsin’s administration would be accused later on for this weakness and concessions 
made to the West that would cost Russia a tremendous amount of effort to recover. 
In relations with NATO as an alliance, Russia could not apply the famous “divide 
and conquer” approach to influence certain decisions as it was successfully doing with 
the EU member-states. This was true because the ultimate say on important decisions 
within the North-Atlantic Alliance rests with the United States.  
2. Russia’s Vision of NATO  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, different factors and developments in 
the Euro-Atlantic space shaped Russia’s attitude towards NATO. Memories of the past 
were influencing the formulation of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s by inertia. 
Russia has certainly inherited the Soviet Union’s ambitions to rule the entire European 
continent. Soviet propaganda has deeply embedded in people’s minds the belief that the 
Soviet Union alone won World War II, saved Europe and the world from an evil like 
fascism and had, therefore, exclusive rights to liberated territories. Although the Soviet 
Union (and later Russia in the early 1990s) had to give up to the West more than it 
seemed possible at that time, namely to pull its troops out from Central and Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s–early 1990s, a bitter sentiment of retreat has remained in 
Russian people’s hearts. That is why President Yeltsin’s accommodating policy towards 
the West, which weakened Russia’s position as the world superpower, was harshly 
criticized by Russian pro-nationalist forces after his retirement. In the late 1990s, the idea 
of restoring Russian dominance over the former Soviet territories still had strong support 
within the Russian political establishment. Indeed the idea is still alive. However, during 
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Yeltsin’s last years in office, Russia’s assertion on the international scene was pretty 
much done through open confrontation with the West. Times have changed and visions 
towards the Euro-Atlantic Alliance as well; however, the negative connotation has not 
vanished completely. That is to say, negativism towards the former rivaling military 
alliance was still at the core of Moscow’s policymaking.  
Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s position on the issue of NATO expansion can be 
best explained by applying the level-of-analysis framework at the level of individual 
leaders and politicians.178 The other two levels (national level – Russian government; 
international system level – military and economic alliances of which Russia was a 
member) were very weak to influence the course of events. Indeed, political life in Russia 
in the 1990s was influenced from the bottom up, i.e., individual leaders and members of 
political elite were determining the government strategies at different points in time and 
were formulating foreign policy goals. Leaders’ personal perceptions can have a 
significant impact on a nation’s behavior on the international scene and should not be 
underestimated. History has witnessed many cases when politicians’ perceptions and 
visions ended up in real deeds. Personal beliefs – acquired through education, culture and 
psychological processes experienced in the past – can explain the predisposition of 
leaders towards certain decisions. Thus, unpredictable behavior (on many occasions for 
Russians themselves) of President Yeltsin was reflected in inconsistency, which 
characterized his administration’s actions in domestic and foreign affairs. The 
inconsistency of Russian diplomacy affected the negotiations process over Transnistria.  
Similarly, Russia-NATO relations were affected by the impulsiveness of Yeltsin’s 
administration. Evolution of these relations went from “understanding” of Poland’s 
aspirations for NATO’s membership, to a strong opposition of the Alliance’s expansion 
and “freezing” the relations.179 However, it would not be fair to evaluate the Kremlin’s 
actions separately from geo-political context and developments in the mid-1990s in 
Europe. NATO can be held guilty to some extent for providing Russian anti-NATO                                                  
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domestic groups with sources of inspiration. By bombing Yugoslavia in 1999 during the 
Kosovo crisis, NATO confirmed its “aggressive nature” as a military alliance. So, NATO 
had to make some concessions in turn and soften Russia’s opposition.  
By signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, Russia has established 
permanent diplomatic and military contacts with its former rival. Relations with NATO 
were maintained through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The forum 
operated on the “19+1” principle (all NATO members before the first wave of 
enlargement plus Russia). In May 2002, this format was replaced by a new arrangement: 
“NATO at 20.” The new agreement allowed Russia to participate as equal members on 
certain issues. 
With all these diplomatic tricks aimed at calming down the spirits within domestic 
political groups, Russia still remained unhappy about NATO’s enlargement to Central 
and Eastern Europe. But whether Russia has reconciled with the fact of the Baltic 
republics joining the alliance, it turned out to be more decisive to oppose any expansion 
of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance to the South-Eastern part of the former Soviet Union 
(Moldova and the Ukraine). After concessions made in Central Europe, Russia decided to 
secure, with all available means, its positions in Transnistria as the last bastion before the 
Balkans. Moreover, Romania’s aspirations to join the North-Atlantic Alliance have 
contributed to Russia’s determination to not withdraw from the Transnistrian region of 
the Republic of Moldova.  
Going back to the individual level-of-analysis theory – if one believes in validity 
of this theory – biographies of current Russian political elite (namely President Putin and 
his close associates, mostly former intelligence officers labeled by Russian people as 
“siloviki”) can hint at Russia’s foreign policy vector for the next decade or so.180 
Developments of the Cold War have converged in Putin’s biography as well. These 
people (former KGB operators) witnessed, from the front-line, the confrontations 
between the two super-powers during the Cold War. They had a chance to get close 
enough to the North-Atlantic Alliance’s assets and see NATO might. On the other hand, 
as front-line warriors, these former Soviet intelligence officers have inherited the spirit of 
                                                 
180 Nickname for people working in defense and security structures (army, police, foreign 
intelligence) coming from Russian word “syla” (force). 
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pride and prestige that their country used to inspire in them. Although the end of the Cold 
War had retired most of these people, it can be presupposed that the idea of revenge has 
always had a place in their minds.  
With all this having been said, people brought to power by President Putin were 
aware of the outcomes of the “exhausting confrontation” with NATO.181 President 
Putin’s team has chosen a different approach to Russia’s re-vitalization as a major actor 
in world politics – through constructive cooperation with the West and the United States. 
The devastated Russian economy could be repaired only by integrating it into the 
network of the world’s advanced economies. The main task remained to identify areas of 
mutual interest and concentrate most efforts towards exploration of these channels of 
cooperation, which should shift the attention attributed to NATO enlargement to other 
issues. Since there were few chances for Russia to stop North-Atlantic Alliance 
expansion, it would make it look like it was done with Russia’s consent as well. However 
cynical it may sound, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States offered 
Russia these “areas of mutual interest.” Russia and the United States became allies in the 
war on terror, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) counter-proliferation and arms 
control policies. 
Political analysts who followed Russia’s performance in international relations 
could notice that Russia uses different tools vis-à-vis different states. When the U.S. 
abusively (in Russia’s eyes) recurred to unilateral actions in defending its strategic 
interests in different parts of the world, Russian diplomacy rushed to draw the attention 
of the international community to the provisions of liberal institutionalism theory of 
international relations. Russians stress then the supremacy of the United Nations in inter-
states relations and dispute resolution, and underscore the importance to obey the 
provisions of the UN Charter. Russia’s opposition to military actions against Iraq in 2003 
can serve as evidence in support of this argument. However, when it comes to policy 
towards the former Soviet republics, Russia seems to forget about idealism and 
institutionalism values, and resorts to unilateralism as well.  
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Russia’s membership in NATO has not been considered so far, neither by the 
Russian political establishment – although it is suggested that it “could be a fundamental 
solution” – nor in NATO’s plans for the future.182 If NATO decides, at some point in 
time in the near future, to open the door for Russia as well it should acknowledge now 
that Russia, understandably, will ask for a seat in the decision-making bodies. That will 
change the balance of power within the alliance. In this case, NATO has a chance to 
become a cumbersome organization, like the European Union, with a very slow decision-
making process. 
Before it happens (if ever), Russia would most likely prefer to make loose 
alliances with main actors within the European Union rather than being bound by the 
alliance’s commitments and obligations (EU). A separate bilateral partnership with the 
United States will diminish the significance and the role of NATO. 
 
C. EUROPEAN UNION – RUSSIA RELATIONS 
1. The EU Policy Towards Russia 
With respect to Russia, the European Union also sought, throughout the 1990s, to 
pursue a differentiated policy. Due to internal problems described in Chapter IV, 
however, the EU did not speak with one voice in negotiations with Russia in the early 
1990s. The first signs of an emerging common policy towards Russia were registered in 
1995 with the Union admission of Sweden, Finland, and Austria. However, it wasn’t until 
1999 that The Common Strategy on Russia was adopted (4 June 1999) in Cologne. In 
December 2001, it was complemented by the EU Country Strategy Paper on Russia, 
which stipulated the objectives and priorities of the EU towards Russia for the period of 
2002–2006.183  
Energy and security constitute two major pillars on which the EU-Russia 
partnership resides. The EU depends on Russian gas and oil, and some studies of EU 
economics indicate that this demand will have a tendency to increase in the future.184 The 
                                                 
182 Baranovsky, 282. 
183 Andrei Zagorski, “EU Policies Towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus,” Occasional Paper 
Series, No.35 (Geneva: Centre for Security Policy), 5. 
184 Pekka, 15.  
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recent Russian-Ukrainian oil scandal, which tangibly affected some European Union 
members as well, has brought to surface this dependency never so clearly visible before. 
Many believe that the expansion of the European Union to South-Eastern Europe 
(namely acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria) would change the whole situation in the 
region. The European Union will have, then, a large portion of a Black Sea coastline (and 
even more after Turkey’s accession). In addition to the fact that the EU’s land border 
with Russia doubled after the first wave of enlargement (Poland and Baltic States), the 
Union will increase its maritime border with Russia as well. Although dimensions of 
cooperation will continue to be determined by political will and interests on both sides of 
the EU future border, calculations in Moscow and Brussels supposedly will change. 
Capital and investments will flow much easier into South-Eastern members of the EU, 
thus increasing the asymmetry against Russia. Russia, in turn, can expect that some of the 
resources it received from the EU before enlargement would be re-directed to newly 
accessed nations.  
In an attempt to avoid becoming overly dispersed in terms of resources, and in 
order to create an intermediate criterion for EU membership, the Union encouraged the 
emergence of regional organizations and initiatives – GUUAM and Pact for Stability in 
South-Eastern Europe – that promote democratic values and norms of cooperation.185  
Both initiatives, by and large, might, in the long-run, lessen Russia’s influence in the 
region (perhaps the former to a larger extent than the latter). This can also be viewed as 
another variation of the containment policy promoted by the EU and the U.S. through 
different regional arrangements. 
By the provisions of the Partnership Cooperation Agreement, signed between the 
EU and Russia in 1994 (in force since 1997) the latter has been granted the status of 
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN). Although Russia could not benefit much from the MFN 
                                                 
185 On October 10, 1997, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine met in 
Strasbourg during summit of the Council of Europe and stated their mutual interest in developing bilateral 
and regional cooperation, European and regional security, political and economic contacts. Thus, the 
initiative has become known as GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) Group 
and was formally founded as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the 
independence and sovereignty of these former Soviet Union republics. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe has been created in the aftermath of Kosovo crisis, on 10 June 1999, the day the UN issued the 
famous Security Council Resolution No. 1244 that ended the NATO air-strikes of former Yugoslavia. 
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status until it joined the World Trade Organization, the fact itself was an indicator of a 
special place the EU attributes to Russia in its foreign policy. Some international relations 
theorists suggest that states (or state-level actors) agree to cooperate on issues that they 
can easily monitor.186 How could Russia, whose state institutions were still weak and 
underdeveloped by the time the PCA was signed, ensure the necessary transparency in 
cooperation with the European Union? 
Although the EU has imposed some conditions and criteria for its cooperation 
with Russia, the former proved unable to use this leverage to prevent the latter from 
interfering in the internal affairs of former Soviet republics. Moreover, by inviting Russia 
to share the responsibilities for maintaining security and stability on the continent, the EU 
provided Russia with a carte-blanche for such interference.187 
For Moldova, it is essential that the EU sticks to its promise to “share everything 
but institutions” with its neighbors in the East as part of the “Wider Europe”188 initiative 
outlined by the EU leaders in 2003.189 Russia definitively falls under the category of the 
EU’s “neighbors in the East” (so does Moldova, in fact) outlined by former President of 
the European Commission, Mr. Romano Prodi. If Russia somehow succeeds in getting a 
seat in the EU’s decision-making bodies, or in getting any other arrangements with the 
EU that would allow her to influence or at least restrain the EU’s freedom in foreign 
policy, then Moldova will lose one more potentially strong ally in negotiations over 
Transnistria.  
Increased U.S. unilateralism could be an incentive for the EU to accept Russia in 
its structures. The more often the U.S. will recur to unilateral actions without the consent 
                                                 
186 Functional theory of international regimes. For detailed analysis of the theory see Robert O. 
Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 107. 
187 The Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June, 1999 on Russia states that “Russia and 
the Union have strategic interests and exercise particular responsibilities in the maintenance of stability and 
security in Europe, and in other parts of the world. The Union considers Russia an essential partner in 
achieving that objective and is determined to cooperate with her.” See Common Strategy of the European 
Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia (1999/414/CFSP), L 157/2. 
188 Later the “Wider Europe” initiative was renamed in European Neighborhood Policy. 
189 See the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi’ speech “Looking ahead in 
transatlantic relations”, given at the dinner at Rayburn House with German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, Washington, 24 June 2003. Last accessed in January 2006 at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp03_322.htm. 
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and consultations with other NATO members, the tighter will become EU-Russia 
relations. To put in simply, Europeans need Russia to blackmail the U.S. Administration. 
In this respect, maintaining good relations with Russia becomes essential. 
2. Russia’s Attitude Vis-A-Vis the European Union 
Russia’s attitude and relations with the European Union have developed in 
indirect proportion to Russia’s relations with NATO. That is to say, against the 
background of negativism towards the North-Atlantic Alliance, the EU was becoming a 
more attractive partner.  
For Russia, the European Union is a steadily growing “economic superpower.”190 
In the era of reduced possibility of conventional warfare, the economic dimension in 
global politics is gaining importance. Economically, Russia depends on the European 
Union. The EU is the largest trade partner for Russia, consuming half of Russia’s 
exports.191 For the EU, in turn, Russia counts just for a few percentages in the total 
volume of the EU’s external trade. So, although the EU values its partnership with 
Russia, an asymmetry does exist in relations between the two. This asymmetry is 
reflected even in the Partnership Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1994. Basically it 
says that Russia assumes to adjust its legislation to the European standards and not vice 
versa. Russian lawyers have never been invited (and never will be) to give advice on 
what these standards should look like. This kind of “partnership” satisfied Russia in 1994 
when she was struggling to overcome a deep economic crisis, and needed the recognition 
of the West as a newly emerging democracy. It could be foreseen, however, that once 
Russia would improve economically it would certainly claim equality in relations with 
the EU. 
Yet, the EU enlargement to South-Eastern Europe in 2007 (Romania and 
Bulgaria) could be a tipping point in EU-Russia relations, which will increase the 
asymmetry even more in favor of the EU. Dimensions of the EU markets will increase 
substantially.  
                                                 
 189 Baranovsky, 284.  
191 In 2002, 53% of Russia’s oil an 62% of natural gas exports went to the EU. See Pekka, 14.  
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However, inclusion of these South-European nations into the European 
community (and even including Turkey) will not significantly increase the security and 
political potential of the EU in comparison with Russia’s potential in these areas. 
 
D. POSSIBLE NATO – EUROPEAN UNION ALLIANCE ON THE 
TRANSNISTRIAN CASE? 
The pattern of future European security settlements depends pretty much upon the 
extent to which the policies and agendas of both alliances for Eastern Europe coincide. 
This coincidence is not in Russia’s interest. Therefore it would most likely keep shifting 
its diplomatic efforts between the two actors in order to keep the coincidence of views as 
low as possible. Conflict between NATO and the EU is not in Russia’s interest either.  
On both sides of the Atlantic, a partnership between NATO and the EU is 
officially welcomed. Preservation of the North-Atlantic Alliance is especially important 
for Europeans before they will develop a robust defense force. For the United States, 
NATO was an institution that has been successfully working for over fifty years now. It 
remains an “institution of choice” as suggested by one U.S. State Department official 
should the need for a combined U.S.-EU military action arise in the future.192 
However, even without Russia’s opposition to NATO/EU involvement in 
Transnistria, cooperation of two alliances seems problematic. First, there is a difference 
in threats perception and, most importantly, in the ways to deal with them. Whereas the 
U.S. puts an emphasis on military power in conflict resolution, the EU leans more 
towards a political option of crisis management.193  The problem with Transnistria is that 
NATO can not use its military arm there. It took an enormous amount of time and 
resources to convince Russian people of the “peaceful intentions” of the North-Atlantic 
Alliance towards Russia; breaking this informal agreement over Transnistria seems 
nonsensical, if not ridiculous. In terms of setting disputes with purely diplomatic means, 
NATO is weaker than the EU and has less experience and less “patience” to conduct 
lengthy negotiations. Europeans are more experienced in this matter. Not all problems 
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Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, December 27, 2005), 4, Order Code RL32342. 
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can be solved by military preemption. NATO has already used the EU mediation 
experience once, in the Balkans. It managed to have a kind of division of labor with the 
EU in settling disputes in former Yugoslav republics, especially in the post-conflict 
phase. 
Second, there is a disagreement between NATO and the EU on the role of 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. The U.S. has already proved that it could intervene in a 
foreign country without a UN Resolution. Talking in realist terms, that suits Moldova 
since Russia is excluded from the decision-making process. Of course, officially, 
Moldova, as a country which aspires to EU membership, can not support such behavior 
from the United States. The EU, on its part, would rely heavily on mentioned institutions 
and would intervene only on secondary roles. It is worth mentioning here that, while the 
EU is proclaiming itself as a pro-UN actor, one should not forget that when it was in the 
interest of most West Europeans to overturn the Milosevic’ regime in Yugoslavia, all 
major EU powers endorsed the air-strikes of a de facto independent country. Another 
issue that also falls under the EU pro-institutionalism principle concerns the presence of 
foreign military on the territory of an independent country. Once the EU is not approving 
the U.S. presence in Iraq, then the same accusations should apply to the illegal presence 
of Russian troops in Transnistria. The problem here is that America’s actions have 
undermined the EU’s moral right to tell Russia what is right and what is wrong. 
Third, in the vision of NATO and EU leaders, there are many much more 
important issues than the Transnistrian one, on which both alliances wish to come to a 
full agreement and understanding of the problem (Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo). In this 
regard, it is doubtful that decision-makers in either institution would want to be distracted 
with an “insignificant” issue like Transnistrian conflict. The “problem” of Moldova, thus, 
was that the separatist conflict in the Eastern part of the country didn’t get “bad enough” 
to matter to the West. How many people in the world heard about Srebrenica before 1995 
and knew where this poor village was located? 
Fourth, both alliances are undergoing internal crises. Solidarity of NATO 
members has been compromised over the military campaign in Iraq, while the process 
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within the EU has been thrown back after the rejection of the Constitution in several 
countries. And besides, European members of NATO have already started to question the 
faithfulness of the United States to the alliance norms, values, principles and the raison 
d’être in general.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although realism is considered a problem-solving theory, it is still not a great 
universal theory. Realism is a theory about the behavior of great powers who make use of 
it to justify their struggle for more power and acquisition of new territories. That was a 
valid theory for Soviet-U.S. confrontation during Cold War times. Realism justifies the 
U.S. hegemony in the post–Cold War era. 
Since small countries like Moldova do not have the ability to contain great 
powers, they tend to rely more on different kind of regimes (international organizations, 
blocs, alliances, etc.) to monitor and constrain, where needed, the behavior of 
neighboring nations and regional hegemonies. Regimes emerge and exist if they are led 
by a powerful leader-state. All three actors discussed here – NATO, EU and Russia – 
theoretically have the capabilities to create an international regime around the Republic 
of Moldova. In fact, Russia has already created an informal regime around Moldova and, 
for the last decade, has forced Moldovan leadership to play by the rules of this regime. 
However, when Chisinau was undertaking measures to adjust to the rules of the created 
regime, the rules were being changed. The pro-Russia strategy adopted by the 
Communist government after the 2001 elections did not accommodate Russia’s interests. 
Russia did not need a friend in South-Eastern Europe. A friend had to be respected. With 
an opponent, things don’t look the same. The basic thing for a regime is a set of clear 
standards for cooperation and interaction, even though they are developed intentionally 
by strong states (those who created and dominate the regime) in order to influence 
weaker states.  
The European Union does not yet have adequate mechanisms to convert the 
Union’s economic and financial strength into a strong political leverage. With respect to 
Russia, the EU can not apply the principle of conditionality as it does in respect to other 
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East European countries that aspire to EU membership. Russia does not have the 
intention to join the Union, therefore EU membership is not at stake in Russia-EU 
relations. As such, Europeans must identify another anchor for Russia on the West that 
would bring her into a kind of dependency on the EU. Russia’s desire to join the World 
Trade Organization can be used as a hook for a while, at least until Russia gets full 
membership. In order to be accepted, Russia has adjusted its legislation and agreed to 
comply with rules and regulations set by the West. 
After bombings of Yugoslavia, the United States widened the gap of 
disagreements within the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. American unilateralism has set a 
negative example and added legitimacy to Russia’s imperialist claims on Transnistria. 
Although the interplay of the three actors will continue, it looks very unlikely that an 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
After his meeting with the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 
2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoope Scheffer stated: “I don’t think NATO will 
get involved in Transnistria and I don’t think the Alliance will have a direct role in this 
region.”194 This kind of statement, however demoralizing and unpleasant the words may 
sound for Moldovan diplomacy (and for general public as well), reflect the current 
disposition within the North Atlantic Alliance. At the moment, counter-engagement 
factors prevail over pro-engagement factors. Just a few of the much more important 
issues that preoccupy NATO leaders today are the internal transformation in the Alliance, 
disagreements amidst member-states over the military campaign in Iraq, and 
overstretched resources in several out-of-area operations. Visions within the leading EU 
nations, vis-à-vis the Union’s enlargement to South-Eastern Europe, haven’t changed 
much over time since the statement of the former EU Commission President Romano 
Prodi, who concluded in 2002 that “the integration of the Balkans will complete the 
unification of the continent.” 
Whatever advantage might come with NATO and EU enlargement, Moldova 
must concentrate on other internal problems besides Transnistria, including corruption, 
implementation of reforms, and building an attractive investment climate. With respect to 
foreign policy, Chapter II tried to emphasize that Chisinau bears some of the guilt for 
such an indifferent attitude of the West towards Moldova. Inconsistency in formulating 
foreign policy objectives throughout the 1990s–early 2000s still works against Moldova 
today, although the country’s leadership undertook significant steps towards 
improvement beginning in 2003. Already, at the end of 2004, Moldovan Foreign Minister 
Andrei Stratan was expressing his strong belief in the irreversibility of the pro-EU 
strategy adopted by the country’s leadership.195  
                                                 
194 Quoted from George Coman, “NATO Isn’t Getting Involved In Transnistria.” Last accessed in 
March 2006 at: http://www.moldova.org/pagini/eng/86/86/ . 
195 Interview with Andrei Stratan, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova (Romanian). Last 
accessed in January 2006 on the official web site of the Moldovan Foreign Ministry at: 
http://www.mfa.md/Ro/Comunicate/2004-12-23InterviuAStratan.htm. 
96 
Now, this strategy should be implemented. Another drawback would be disastrous 
for Moldova and would remove the nation from the international arena for an indefinite 
period of time. Systematic evaluations of supporting plans are crucial in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency. Public support and awareness of Moldova’s commitments 
are even more important. A serious public debate has to be instigated by the indigenous 
mass-media and international non-governmental organizations.  
In the meantime, the Transnistrian problem should not consume the bulk of the 
nation’s resources. Strengthening security along the Moldovan-Ukrainian segment of the 
border (as well as the internal administrative border with Transnistria and the rest of the 
country) is an essential element. With respect to this issue, Moldova should exploit all 
opportunities: bilateral negotiations with Kiev, and U.S. and major European powers 
putting pressure on the Ukraine. The EU has already deployed its “eyes” and “ears” in the 
region with the EU-led Border Assistance Mission to Moldovan-Ukrainian border. 
The truth is that Moldova lost the momentum for solving the separatism issue in 
Transnistria in the 1990s. The process of European integration was very dynamic; the 
internal climate in NATO was much better than today and Russia was barely surviving 
from one domestic political crisis to another. During this time Moldova was shifting back 
and forth between pro-Eastern and pro-Western options of foreign policy. When Chisinau 
finally (and hopefully forever) chose the Western way, the situation changed – not in 
Moldova’s favor. The process of further strengthening the European Union was stalled 
when France and the Netherlands rejected the EU Constitution. After 2001, Europe 
became a target of large-scale terrorist attacks. The bombings in Madrid on 11 March 
2004, and in London one year later, inevitably strengthened the anti–“those-others” mood 
in Europe. But it is important to note that all these tragedies instigated a new wave of 
mistrust among old EU members.196  
In NATO, the United State’s U.S. unilateral decision to go to war over Iraq, and, 
in this context, calls for a “coalition of the willing,” have brought the North-Atlantic 
Alliance to an internal crisis as well. The United States, as the leading ally in NATO, has 
become deeply involved in the post-conflict stabilization operation in Iraq. The shift in 
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instate unilaterally border control for people traveling between Schengen states. 
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priorities in NATO – from a European area of operation to an out-of-area crisis – has 
distanced the Transnistrian conflict even more. 
After the rise to power of the young and ambitious President Vladimir Putin, 
Russia became more vocal in international affairs. Political analysts in the West started to 
express concerns about Russia’s neo-imperialism offensive on its “near abroad.” Her 
ambitions are supported by a steady growth of the Russian economy. In the meantime, 
President Putin’s administration tries to avoid open confrontation with either alliance. In 
the case of the European Union, Russia succeeded better by applying the divide and 
conquer approach. By controlling the domestic gas industry, Russian leaders have 
masterfully managed, so far, to convert economic wealth into political leverage. Separate 
agreements and projects with major European nations (Germany and France) constantly 
increase the cost of the stakes for all parties involved, thus making both Europeans and 
Russians more inter-dependent. 
Against such a background, Moldova’s invested hopes in NATO and the 
European Union look quite blurry. NATO and the EU would most likely proceed very 
carefully in respect to the Transnistrian conflict, always taking into account Russia’s 
reaction and interests in the region. In the status quo, no party would go for significant 
changes because the benefits from trying to do so are not commensurate with “the 
anticipated costs of bringing about these changes.”197 
In today’s circumstances, it appears very difficult for Chisinau to “sell” the 
Transnistrian case to Western partners. Yet, the severity of the Transnistrian problem, 
from a security standpoint, is not advertised in Europe to a full extent by Moldova. Huge 
ammunition stockpiles, left behind in Transnistria by the Soviet regime, are not properly 
secured. Proliferation of arms is an issue discussed everywhere nowadays. Moldova can 
not depend on NATO and the EU. While continuing to knock on the doors of NATO and 
the EU, Moldova should concentrate its efforts on regional cooperation within the 
framework of such organizations as GUUAM and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe. That is to say, Chisinau should incite concerns about the Transnistrian “black 
hole” in the closest ring of states surrounding Moldova. However weak these regional 
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arrangements might look at the moment, participating nations have created a pool of 
expertise, and seem willing to support each other to overcome problems linked with the 
transition to a liberal democracy and a free market economy. 
More efforts should be dedicated to a bilateral cooperation. Potential sponsor-
nations can lobby for the inclusion of Moldova on the political agenda in both NATO and 
the EU. With all the internal problems discussed in this thesis, neither the North-Atlantic 
Alliance nor the European Union has completely closed the door for Moldova. NATO is 
pushing Moldova to better explore the opportunities offered through the “Partnership for 
Peace” program (namely by drafting and implementing the nation-tailored Individual 
Partnership Action Plan), whereas the European Union has signed the EU-Moldova 
Action Plan in the first half of 2005. Moldova has been given a chance to prove – on a 
case by case basis – that it is a reliable partner and worth attention. The only reasonable 
option for Moldova today is to use both opportunities to “anchor itself to the West.”198 
It remains clear, however, that the Transnistrian conflict requires an external 
solution agreed upon by three players discussed in this thesis. While continuation of the 
dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol represent an important element in the whole 
process, the center of gravity in negotiations is the middle of the triangle: NATO – EU – 
Russia. Transnistria is not the only controversial problem on the agenda of these players. 
At some point, one party might agree to make some concessions in one issue, in favor of 
bigger gains in another. The Russian region of Kaliningrad is also part of unpleasant 
discussions between Russia and Western partners. What incentives might come up in 
negotiations between the two sides, to give up positions on a particular issue (in our case, 
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